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1. Introduction 
Poverty is wrong. A Basic Income Guarantee would put an 
end to poverty. It would provide economic security to 
everyone, like an insurance policy, for you, me, Uncle 
Charlie, Aunt Jane. It gives all of us the assurance that, no 
matter what happens, we won’t starve. Loss of a job, or 
sickness, won’t put a family onto the street. 
Sheahen (2006: 3). 
The quote above, borrowed from an interview of a United States -based basic income 
researcher Allan Sheahen, sets the fundamental motivation for many basic income 
activists. The underlying idea is very simple: “poverty is wrong” and the provision of 
basic income is the ultimate solution to this problem. Not surprisingly, this idea is 
attractive to many development researchers due to its somewhat unique claim of 
providing a key solution to the alleviation of poverty. 
This promise caught my attention during my stay in Namibia from January to June 
2008. During that time, the Namibian Basic Income Grant (BIG) Coalition made 
headlines as the BIG pilot project had recently been launched, and the hopes for it 
succeeding were high. I was curious to find out more about this project and decided to 
concentrate  on  the  issue  in  my  master’s  thesis.  At  the  very  beginning,  I  was  first  and  
foremost interested in the results of the pilot project. However, as I began to conduct the 
interviews, it became clear that the proposal and the work of the BIG Coalition included 
a number of aspects which were not discussed in public. Therefore, I decided to leave 
the original idea aside, and began to search for information concerning the history and 
development of the BIG proposal in southern Africa. 
The basic income proposal has attracted supporters from different backgrounds, and 
these supporters have formed various networks and organizations1. In South Africa a 
number of organizations formed a coalition supporting the basic income grant proposal, 
and thereafter a similar coalition was formed in Namibia. The Namibian Basic Income 
Grant (BIG) Coalition has actively lobbied for the grant and organized a pilot project to 
gain more support for its views. 
This  thesis  takes  a  closer  look  to  the  work  of  the  Namibian  BIG  Coalition.  The  BIG  
proposal in South Africa and its influence on the formation of the Namibian Coalition 
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will be discussed. The critical events in the relations with the surrounding environment 
will be scrutinized. I will argue that the response of the Coalition to the criticism reveals 
a lack of social legitimacy in relation to its environment. Due to understandable reasons, 
a number of people feel strongly attached to the idea of BIG. This work will not 
comment on the results of the Basic Income Grant experiment in Omitara/Otjivero 
village  of  Namibia.  It  is  neither  an  attack  for  or  against  the  idea  of  universal  basic  
income. Instead, the challenges faced by the BIG Coalition will be addressed, drawing 
conclusions from evidence based on several discussions, newspaper articles, 
observations, and theoretical background studying organizations and development 
projects. 
The introduction to this thesis provides the background information of Namibia. 
Thereafter, the concept of basic income will be discussed. The second part of the thesis 
presents the theoretical background of the research, and finally draws together the 
research question. The third part presents the methodological approach and data 
analysis. The results of this research are presented in four chapters, each providing 
certain perspective to the actions of the BIG Coalition; in the fourth chapter, the BIG 
Coalition is analyzed from the organizational viewpoint, and the stakeholders as well as 
the environment of the coalition are scrutinized; the fifth chapter analyzes the 
background of the Namibian BIG proposal and the critical occurrences in the formation 
of  the  coalition;  the  sixth  chapter  of  the  thesis  analyzes  the  clashes  between  the  BIG  
Coalition and its environment from the viewpoint of social legitimacy; and finally, these 
three parts are concluded in the seventh chapter, where the formation and the actions of 
the BIG Coalition are analyzed in the context of policy and practice. The final chapter 
provides an overview of the research with concluding remarks and makes policy 
recommendations and proposes further research topics. 
1.1 Background of the Country 
The Republic of Namibia is located in south-western part of Africa. The western part of 
the country faces South Atlantic Ocean, and the neighboring countries include South 
Africa in the south, Botswana in the east and Angola in the north. The country is also 
connected to Zambia and Zimbabwe via Caprivi Strip in the north-eastern part of the 
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country. Namibia gained independence from South Africa in 1990 and Germany 
occupied the area during the years 1886-1915 (BBC 2009a). The population of the 
country is roughly two million and the total area of the vast country is 824,292 square 
kilometers  (BBC  2009b).  The  HDI2 rank of the country in 2007 was 128 out of 182 
countries (UNDP 2009a). The GDP per capita was US$ 5,155, rating the country 105 
out of 181 countries (2009a). 
  Population 2 200 000 (2008 estimate) 
Languages spoken at home:   
(Percentage of Households)   
Oshiwambo 48 % 
Nama/Damara 11 % 
Afrikaans 11 % 
Kavango (Rukwangali) 10 % 
Otjiherero 8 % 
People living with HIV/AIDS   
Aged 15-49 19,9% (2006) 
Life expectancy at birth 51,6 years (2005) 
People living with below US$1 a day 34,90 % 
People living with below US$2 a day 55,80 % 
Population density   
Persons per km2 2,1 
Religion   
Christian 80-90% 
Literacy Rate   
People aged over 15 85% (2005) 
Unemployment rate 36,7% (2004) 
Table 1: Namibia in a Nutshell 
(Hopwood 2008: 3,5) 
 
Namibia gained independence in 1990 after a long struggle. The Swapo Party of 
Namibia, originating from the liberation movement South West Africa People’s 
Organization has been in power continuously after the independence, and the elections 
of 2009 did not change the situation. The official National Assembly Election Results of 
2009 announced by the Electoral Commission of Namibia indicated 74,29% of support 
to Swapo Party, leaving the new opposition party Rally for Democracy and Progress 
(RDP) second with 11,16% of the votes. The presidential candidate of Swapo and the 
current president of the country, Hifikepunye Pohamba, received an even larger portion 
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of the votes (75,25%) while the presidential candidate of RDP, Hidipo Hamutenya 
received 10,91% of the votes. The observer mission of African Union (AU) declared its 
satisfaction with the elections, although referring to certain minor challenges. Civil 
society organizations set up observation missions, and did not report severe 
irregularities. However, the opposition parties disputed the results of the election. 
(Melber 2010.) 
Poverty and Inequality in Namibia 
The Namibia Household Income and Expenditure Survey (NHIES) conducted by the 
Central Bureau of Statistics during the years 2003/2004, provides some key figures 
providing information of Namibia (CBS 2006: 2). According to the report, “[o]nly 10 
per cent of the households with the highest income account for nearly half the total 
income, whereas 90 per cent stand for the other half” (2006: 41). In addition to this, the 
Gini3 coefficient for the country is 0,6 – indicating a highly unequal distribution of 
income (2006: 41). This ranks Namibia as one of the most unequal countries in the 
world (2006: 40). Furthermore, using the food consumption ratio as one measure of 
poverty, “the results show that there are systematic differences between different groups 
of households. The 5 per cent of households with the lowest income have a food 
consumption ratio between 80 and 100 per cent, whereas the 2 per cent of households 
with the highest income have a food consumption ratio of less than 40 per cent” (2006: 
41).  In  addition  to  this,  the  country  is  affected  by  the  HIV/AIDS  epidemic.  It  is  
estimated that 15% of adults aged 15-49 carry the virus (UNAIDS 2008). The 
unemployment rate is also high – according to the Namibia Labour Force Survey in 
2008, 51,2% of Namibians are unemployed (Duddy 2010). 
The stark contrast between rich and poor is clearly visible for example in the capital city 
Windhoek. Modern shopping-centers offer various services for people from upper- and 
middle-class residential areas – for those who drive their four-wheel drives on Fridays 
to their holiday apartments to the coast, or to their farms in the countryside. These 
residents build their houses behind high electric fences and rarely leave the house 
without  their  car.  Residential  areas  such  as  Eros,  Avis,  Hochland  Park  and  Klein  
Windhoek are full of these houses. On the northern side of the centre of Windhoek, one 
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finds one of the poorest residential area of the city: Katutura. The word means “a place 
where we don’t want to live” and originates from the forced removal of 1961, where 
black residents were moved from the “Old Location” to Katutura. Currently the central 
area of Katutura has transformed into a middle-class residential area, but moving further 
away from the city centre, the informal settlement areas can be found. Although even 
these areas are relatively safe during daytime, most of the streets have names, and the 
informal houses have electricity, the contrast between these areas and the before-
mentioned rich ones is enormous. 
Background of the BIG Proposal in Namibia 
The Namibian BIG Coalition was formed in 2005 to lobby for the implementation of 
the basic income grant in the country. According to them, basic income grant is the key 
element in the solution of the problems caused by unemployment and poverty. In order 
to gain more support for the proposal, the coalition conducted an experiment in a small 
Namibian village called Omitara, some hundred kilometers east from the capital city 
Windhoek. Each inhabitant of the village received a monthly payment of N$100 
regardless of the age or employment level of the beneficiary (an exception to this were 
pensioners, who did not receive the grant as they are eligible for the government-funded 
old-age pension). The experiment began in January 2008, and continued until the end of 
2009.  The official hope of the coalition was that the BIG would have been introduced 
on  a  national  level  in  Namibia  after  the  elections  of  2009,  and  after  the  pilot  project  
experiment. The coalition also has international stakeholders as it has international 
donors,  and  the  origins  of  the  Namibian  BIG  Coalition  are  in  South  Africa.  Before  
continuing the introduction to the theoretical background of the thesis, I will discuss the 
concept of basic income in more detail. 
1.2 The Concept of Basic Income and the History of the Proposal 
According to John Cunliffe and Guido Erreygers, the first ideas concerning the concept 
of basic income can be traced to Fourierist tradition4. Joseph Charlier discussed 
unconditional basic income in his work Solution du Problème Social in 1848. He 
presented the idea of an unconditional grant, which would be paid to every individual in 
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the society without means-testing. Furthermore, it was supposed to provide certain level 
of subsistence. The role of Charlier is discussed in the work of John Cunliffe and Guido 
Erreygers. (2001.) 
In the United States, James Tobin suggested a basic income in 1967, and presidential 
candidate George McGovern supported the idea during his campaign in 1972. However, 
Van Parijs argues that the concept of basic income has gained more support in European 
countries later on in 1970s in countries he determines as being “’left-liberal' (in the 
European sense)”. (Van Parijs 2000.)5 
Philippe Van Parijs and Stuart White build their argument concerning basic income 
around Difference Principle of John Rawls. The base for Difference Principle lies in the 
Rawls's definition of fair equality of opportunity. His statement of justice includes two 
principles: “First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of 
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others” (Rawls 
1972: 53). Secondly: “Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they 
are both (a) to the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to 
offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (1972: 
72). This second part can be seen as a simplified Difference Principle (ibid.).6 The 
Difference Principle can be considered as a justification for basic income, at least the 
arguments from the Basic Income Grant Coalition seem to follow this line of deduction. 
According to Van Parijs, a liberal theory of justice is “one that is truly committed to an 
equal concern for all and to nondiscrimination among conceptions of the good life” 
(1991: 102). He claims that the idea of BIG actually is not unfair towards some, hard-
working, people (often the counter-argument for the idea). To clarify the argument, he 
points out that he has approved “real-libertarian” definition as the concept of social 
justice, which means, the “real freedom” of individuals should be in “maximin”7. This 
means that the priority should be given to the ones who have “the least amount of real 
freedom” (1991: 103). He uses the Difference Principle by Rawls described above as a 
starting point “that is, the requirement that socioeconomic advantages - - should be 
maximinned, that is, distributed in such a way that the least advantaged end up with at 
least  as  many  such  advantages  as  the  least  advantaged  would  end  up  with  under  any  
alternative arrangement” (1991: 104). But the Difference Principle, according to Van 
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Parijs is a bit loose, although he believes the Principle recommends “- - that one should 
introduce a wealth-distributing, power-conferring, self-respect-preserving unconditional 
basic income, indeed, that one should introduce such an income at the highest 
sustainable level,” (1991: 105) and therefore Van Parijs develops the idea further 
concentrating on the concept of Ronald Dworking, equality of external resources 
(1991).8 He  clarifies  the  concepts  of  external  resources  and  the  determination  of  their  
value. Van Parijs clearly supports the idea of a society which is willing to redistribute, 
and organize itself in such a way that it is possible to pay basic income. 
1.3 The Definition of Basic Income 
There are several different, but closely linked definitions for the words basic income, 
and the term is also used in slightly different forms. In order to understand the 
differences between the definitions, I will shortly present some of them here. According 
to Stuart White (1997), the “idea of unconditional income” has three requirements. 
These are: the income is paid “(a) on an individual basis, (b) irrespective of income 
from other sources, and (c) without regard to past or present work performance or 
willingness to accept a job if offered” (1997: 312). He uses the abbreviation UBI from 
the words unconditional basic income (emphasis added, 1997: 312). In this respect the 
idea of an unconditional grant is stressed, which refers to the UBI being opposite to 
other, means-tested, conditional grants. 
Pieter le Roux has concentrated on the idea of basic income in South Africa, and he uses 
the words universal income grant. As the word “universal” suggests, le Roux stresses 
the idea of everyone receiving the grant. In this definition le Roux goes further than 
White, since he even determines the amount of the grant. Le Roux has specifically 
concentrated on financing the grant through indirect taxes and increase in the value-
added tax (VAT). (Le Roux 2003: 39.) 
As White, Philippe Van Parijs also uses the term universal basic income (UBI) which, 
he argues, should be paid to everyone at a level “sufficient for subsistence” (2000). 
According to Van Parijs,  the term “basic” refers to “something on which a person can 
safely count,” but, according to him, it is not connected to the “notion of 'basic needs'” 
(2000). Now, I want to point out the differences in definitions. Van Parijs suggests that 
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basic income is ideally given to permanent residents. He also stresses that the idea is not 
to offer individuals a possibility to purchase all the basic necessities, but to offer an 
income a person can rely on, and in this enable the individual to plan for future 
activities. 
The definitions above are not necessarily exclusive. It is difficult to tell whether there 
are actual differences of opinion between the researchers about the definition or if they 
only emphasize different aspects. Furthermore, in the debate of the Basic Income 
Research Journal, some of the researchers simply use the term “Basic Income,” BI (see 
for example Widerquist 2006, Groot 2006 and Virjo 2006). Keeping the definitions 
given above in mind, I cite here the Namibian Basic Income Grant Coalition, or more 
specifically, the definition provided by Claudia and Dirk Haarmann, who write on 
behalf of the Desk for Social Development (DfSD) of the Evangelical Lutheran Church 
in the Republic of Namibia: 
“A Basic Income Grant (BIG) is a monthly cash grant (e.g. 
N$100) that would be paid by the state to every Namibian 
citizen regardless of age or income. The money, which is paid 
to people not in need, is recuperated through the tax system. - 
- Every Namibian would receive such a grant until s/he 
becomes eligible for a state pension at 60 years. In the case 
of children aged 17 or younger, the care-giver would receive 
the grant on behalf of the child.”   
(Haarmann & Haarmann 2005.) 
Haarmann and Haarmann refer to the role of the state, and the sum is proposed. In 
addition to the definitions above, the recuperation through tax system is mentioned here. 
Furthermore, here the grant is restricted to people under the age of 60, in a way that the 
final level of all grants paid by the state remains unchanged. As explained above, there 
are various, slightly different definitions for the idea of Basic Income, but as the details 
of the Namibian BIG will be under scrutiny here, the definition of Haarmann and 
Haarmann are adopted. In line with this, the abbreviation for basic income grant, BIG 
will be used. 
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1.4 Aim of the Thesis 
The aim of  this  thesis  is  to  study  the  Basic  Income Grant  (BIG)  proposal  in  Namibia  
and the organizational structure and motivations behind this proposal. There are at least 
three reasons for my interest in this specific topic. First, the discussion concerning basic 
income proposal in Namibia has been dominated by the BIG Coalition. This thesis 
offers another perspective, as it analyzes the work of the coalition itself. Secondly, the 
discussion on this proposal has an international aspect as the corresponding proposal 
has also been presented in South Africa. The discussion on the BIG does not only reach 
to Namibia, but also to South Africa, which certainly is the most influential country in 
the area. Therefore, it is even more important to discuss the proposal from several 
perspectives. Finally, there is a growing international interest towards alternative forms 
of development cooperation. Conditional and unconditional cash grant programs are 
being discussed worldwide and this thesis contributes to this discussion on its part. 
Although the BIG proposal itself  is  not commented upon in this thesis,  it  reminds that 
the experiments such as the BIG pilot project should be scrutinized against the 
motivations behind the proposal. Therefore, the thesis contributes to the wider 
international discussion on NGO coalitions and cash grant programmes. 
2. Theoretical Background 
There is a number of possibilities to study the concept of BIG and the work of the BIG 
Coalition. As mentioned earlier, I was originally interested in the impact of the BIG 
proposal. However, data collection concerning the pilot project proved to be quite a 
challenge for two reasons. First, it was practically impossible to collect detailed 
information  concerning  for  example  the  consumption  patterns  of  the  citizens  of  
Omitara9.  Secondly,  the  information  made  available  by  the  BIG  Coalition  was  not  
enough to analyze the change in Omitara area, and requests for further data were denied. 
Especially this second point led me to further concentrate on the work of the BIG 
Coalition and to study its background. As the focus of this research is on the BIG 
Coalition, its history and formation, organization theory provides the proper theoretical 
background for the study. This then leads to the theory of David Mosse, which 
discusses development organizations, their policy proposals, and practice. 
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2.1 Background of the Study 
This  study  takes  a  look  into  the  BIG  Coalition,  which  has  been  formed  by  Namibian  
non-governmental organizations, and its development during a time period of roughly 
five years. The starting point for this study is the definition of NGO sector in Namibia, 
and the formulation of the BIG Coalition. The relation between the coalition and its 
environment will be discussed. The data consists of interviews and observations from 
two field visits (conducted in 2008 and 2009), and of newspaper articles mostly 
covering the time period of five years, some articles reaching back to the beginning of 
the decade. 
The four chapters of results provide a number of interlinked viewpoints to the Namibian 
proposal. First, the stakeholder analysis will introduce the set-up of the BIG Coalition in 
detail, and discuss the coalition as a specific form of an organization. Secondly, the 
formation of the coalition and critical events in the development of the proposal will be 
discussed. The third part of the results looks at the work of the coalition in connection to 
its environment. The theory of resource dependency – a theory originally presented by 
Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik (1978) is a central element in this analysis. In 
more detail, the concept of social legitimacy will be used. Finally the propositions 
concerning policy and practice by David Mosse (2005) will be discussed, as the debate 
concerning basic income is set to an international framework of development 
cooperation. 
The case of the BIG proposal in this context is rather unique, especially from the 
perspective of the two-year pilot project of an unconditional cash grant. As the interest 
is in the very work of the BIG Coalition in Namibia, this study is an intrinsic case 
study (Stake 1995: 3); the study concentrates on analyzing this specific proposal in its 
unique environment, and does not attempt to directly generalize the results to other 
situations. 
2.2 Organization Theory 
Mary Jo Hatch and Ann L. Cunliffe describe the tradition of organizational research in 
their book Organization Theory (2006). They remind that the theorists come from very 
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different backgrounds, and from the time period when organization research was not a 
well-established field of academic study. The sociological and managerial traditions of 
organization theory draw from two different fields of study: “The sociological source, 
represented here by Émile Durkheim, Max Weber and Karl Marx, focused on the 
changing shapes and roles of formal organizations within society and the influences of 
industrialization on the nature of work and its consequences for workers. Classical 
management theory was shaped by Frederick Taylor, Mary Parker Follett - - and others 
- - and focused on the practical problems faced by managers - - .” (2006: 26-27.) This 
study relies on the sociological tradition of organization theory, more specifically on the 
theories of organizational environment and resource dependence. 
2.3 Non-Governmental Organizations 
According to London School of Economics Centre for Civil Society, the institutional 
forms of “uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values” 
refer to non-governmental organizations, which are the central element of this thesis 
(London School of Economics 2004). 10 According to Clarke, “NGOs are private, non-
profit, professional organizations, with a distinctive legal character, concerned with 
public welfare goals. In the developing world, NGOs include philanthropic foundations, 
church development agencies, academic think-tanks and other organizations focusing on 
issues such as human rights, gender, health, agricultural development, social welfare, 
the environment, and indigenous peoples” (Clarke 1998: 36-37). It is debatable whether 
the NGOs in Namibia are “professional organizations,” but they certainly include most 
of the characteristics Clarke mentions above. The Namibian example of this includes 
the Desk for Social Development of ELCRN, an organization which is a church 
development agency. As the number of different NGOs in the country is large, almost 
all the other organization types mentioned by Clarke can be found from the country. 
David Korten discusses three generations concerning voluntary development action. 
The first generation organizations answer to the specific needs of the beneficiaries. 
They  often  provide  relief  for  a  short  period  of  time,  as  they  aim for  quickly  assisting  
those in need. The second generation, in turn, concentrates more on the developmental 
aspect of the specific group and the NGO and this group enter into a partnership, where 
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the organization is facilitating the activities of people themselves. Korten reminds that 
in practice, these project end up providing mere handouts. Third generation NGOs seek 
to influence policies, as they have reached a point where it is understood that a single 
organization can rarely bring large-scale change in any country. This gives the 
organization a more catalytic role in development. However, Korten points out that the 
third generation organizations also face challenges he has not recognized in this theory. 
He refers to the argument of Serrano, where it is stated that “development theorists and 
practitioners” should learn new ways to discuss development, and look further than to 
the work of reparation in the cases of development projects (Korten 1990: 124). (1990: 
114-124.) 
Alan Thomas and Tim Allen claim that NGOs are often funded by government, but a 
key characteristic is that they are usually organizations not for profit. Thomas and Allen 
also distinguish between mutual benefit organizations and public benefit organizations. 
The first ones provide benefits for their members, and the second ones provide these to 
others  who  provide  services  to  non-members  as  well.  The  “scope  and  scale”  of  these  
organizations also vary from “local, national and international” levels. Thomas and 
Allen claim that due to the declining roles of the states,  the NGO sector has grown in 
the past half a century. However, they doubt that NGOs would ever bring a large change 
in an international context, as there is not enough funding available. (Thomas and Allen 
2000: 210-213.) The Namibian BIG Coalition seems to have understood the claim by 
Thomas  and  Allen,  as  they  seek  to  influence  the  politics  of  Namibia  rather  than  work  
for mutual benefit of its members. The strategy of the coalition has been to form a 
pressure group, and as Margareth E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink note “[n]etworks often 
have their greatest impact by working through governments and other powerful actors” 
(Keck & Sikkink 1998: 102). 
The BIG Coalition will be understood as a coalition of different organizations, but also 
as an organization itself, with its own specific aims and functions. The analysis 
concentrates on the work of the coalition, and its development. It seems that the 
organization  has  multiple  roles  in  Namibia,  and  these  roles  sometimes  contradict  with  
each other. Interestingly, the coalition seems to have functions in all generations of 
voluntary development action by Korten: The coalition has a pilot project, where urgent 
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needs for relief of the people in one village is provided. The organization, on the other 
hand, believes that handouts do assist people in need, as they can then empower 
themselves, and therefore the organization can be a mere facilitator of development – by 
providing  funds.  Finally,  the  coalition  has  an  activist  role  as  it  lobbies  for  the  policy  
proposal of basic income. The BIG proposal itself may be understood as a generation 
four project, as it can be understood as a new and innovative way for development, 
despite the relatively simple character of the proposal. 
As the role of NGOs in advocacy work has increased in the past decades, the discussion 
on the legitimacy and accountability of these organizations themselves has recently 
increased.  The  criteria  for  NGO  legitimacy  are  set  for  example  by  Atack  (1999),  and  
Unerman & O’Dwyer (2006) have theorized accountability for advocacy actions of 
NGOs. Hudson (2001) encourages NGOs to improve the relationships among 
themselves and those the organizations claim to represent. He understands the concept 
of legitimacy as a “socially constructed quality” (2001: 331) in a similar way as Lister 
(2003) discusses it. The concept of legitimacy is one of the central themes in this thesis, 
and as Hudson and Lister, I understand the concept as a social construct. Therefore, it is 
interesting to see, how the BIG Coalition seeks for social legitimacy in Namibia. 
2.4 Coalition as an Organization 
Although this study discusses the BIG Coalition from organizational perspective, 
coalition differs from other forms of organizations. Helen Yanacopulos distinguishes 
between networks and coalitions. According to her, “NGO coalitions form more 
permanent links than single-issue thematic transnational advocacy networks” 
(Yanacopulos 2005: 95). Permanent staff members and a more permanent membership 
base are also characteristics of coalitions. “Most importantly, they have broader 
strategic aims than single-issue thematically focused networks,” Yanacopulos adds 
(ibid.). Furthermore, a high level of commitment is required from the coalition member 
organizations (2005: 96). 
Maria Roberts-DeGennaro discusses coalitions in the context of political advocacy. This 
brings in the concept of lobbying. Roberts-DeGennaro states that “[a]s a set of 
interacting organizations, the whole coalition must be guided by a purpose. This 
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dimension distinguishes a coalition from any loosely coupled group of organizations” 
(Roberts-DeGennaro 1986: 309). Roberts-DeGennaro reminds that when the coalition is 
being built, it is vital that the organizations understand why being a member of the 
coalition is in their best interest and that the purpose of the coalition should also be 
stated (1986: 309). 
To conclude from these two sets of requirements for the coalitions, I will look into the 
following characteristics in the Namibian BIG Coalition. They are permanent links, 
permanent staff members, and permanent membership base. They contribute to the 
stability of the coalition. Second, I will look for the broad strategic aims of the coalition, 
and its purpose. Third, I will analyze the viewpoints on how the organizations think 
they benefit from the membership. 
2.5 Organizational Environment and Stakeholders 
Organizational environment in modernist organization theories, according to Hatch and 
Cunliffe, is considered “as an entity that lies outside the boundary of the organization - - 
It influences organizational outcomes by imposing constraints and demanding 
adaptation as the price of survival. The organization - - faces uncertainty about what the 
environment demands and experiences dependence on the multiple resources that its 
environment provides” (Hatch and Cunliffe 2006: 63). The first step in defining the 
environment is to define the organization, and decide where the organizational boundary 
lies. Hatch and Cunliffe also remind that different levels of environment may be used in 
the analysis, although the level of environment, to which one is focusing on at the 
specific moment, should be clearly stated in order to avoid confusion (2006: 66). 
2.6 Resource Dependence and Social Legitimacy 
The ideas of modernism, originating from the Enlightenment and initiated by 
philosophers Descartes, Locke and Kant, form the background for the Modernist 
organization theory. According to Hatch and Cunliffe “[m]odernist organization 
theorists believe that complete knowledge means understanding how and why 
organizations function the way they do and how their functioning is influenced by 
different environmental conditions” (2006: 37). Hatch and Cunliffe discuss the 
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resource dependence theory in the context of modernist theories of organizational 
environment. Pfeffer and Salancik emphasize the influence of the environment, as the 
organizations need resources and therefore they “must interact with others who control 
those resources” (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 278). The vulnerability of the organization, 
according to Hatch and Cunliffe, “is the result of its need for resources such as raw 
materials, labor, capital, equipment, knowledge and outlets for its products and services 
– resources that are controlled by the environment” (Hatch & Cunliffe 2006: 81). An 
important element in the analysis is the identification of these resources, and tracing 
them and after this, the environmental factors affecting the relationships between 
organization and its environments are searched for (2006: 80-83).11 
David Lewis discusses organization theory in relation to NGO management in his book 
The Management of Non-Governmental Development Organizations (2007). According 
to  Lewis,  many parts  of  the  organizational  theory  are  applicable  to  NGOs,  and  Lewis  
searches for the interaction points between the two (2007: 107). He addresses different 
areas of organization theory, which can be discussed in relation to NGOs. One of these 
is the already mentioned resource dependence perspective by Pfeffer and Salancik. The 
resource dependence perspective has been challenged for example by arguing that it 
perceives the organizations to be working under circumstances beyond their own 
control (ibid.). However, in this thesis, the perspective will be critically applied to the 
data collected. I am of the opinion that this perspective enhances the understanding of 
the work and activities, and certain choices made by the BIG Coalition. 
The perspective of Hudson (2001) concerning legitimacy and political responsibility is 
briefly mentioned above. As Hudson, I perceive the legitimacy of an organization as a 
social construct, and therefore argue, that the organization needs to constantly search for 
it in its environment. Hudson argues, that “an NGO will find it extremely difficult – to 
put it mildly – to be perceived as legitimate by all of its differently-positioned 
stakeholders” (2001: 332). An organization needs several resources in order to function, 
but as I am interested in the legitimacy of the organization among its stakeholders, I will 
only look at social legitimacy as a resource in this thesis. Therefore, this study argues 
that the search for social legitimacy influences the internal work of the BIG Coalition. 
It is important to find out, who searches for it as well as the ways it is searched for. 
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2.7 From NGO-group to Development Organization 
The BIG Coalition, its formation and transformation is analyzed in detail in the results 
of this thesis and the relationship with the environment is also under scrutiny. The final 
part of the analysis looks into the coalition in the context of development cooperation 
and  into  the  role  of  the  coalition  in  the  context  of  the  Namibian  society.  It  draws  
together the elements from the earlier chapters and understands the BIG Coalition as an 
organization with the aim of development which is partially funded by donors. 
Therefore this part of the thesis considers the Coalition as a development NGO, and 
takes a viewpoint from where the activities are considered as those of development 
actor. David Mosse (2005) has conducted ethnographic research of British aid agencies 
working in India and his propositions will be considered from the viewpoint of the BIG 
in Namibia. 
Mosse presents “five propositions about policy and practice” concerning development 
cooperation projects (2005: 14). These will be analyzed in the context of the BIG 
Coalition. The first argument states that “policy primarily functions to mobilise and 
maintain  political  support,  that  is  to  legitimise  rather  than  to  orientate  practice”.  This  
statement means that projects are not necessarily conducted in order to find best 
practices, but to legitimize the current one and seek support for it. The second argument 
states that “development interventions are not driven by policy but by the exigencies of 
organisations and the need to maintain relationships”. The second argument adds to the 
first one by stating that it is not the policy itself, which orientates the actions of 
organizations, but the mere urgency to legitimize the existence of the organization and 
its relations with the environment. The third proposal, in turn, suggests that 
“development projects work to maintain themselves as coherent policy ideas (as 
systems of representations) as well as operational systems”. This argument refers to the 
dual role of development organizations: They need to show consistency within their 
policy proposals, and on the other hand continue with the project in question. The fourth 
proposal discusses how the projects are failed and states: “Projects do not fail; they are 
failed  by  wider  networks  of  support  and  validation.”  As  the  BIG proposal  is  not  fully  
dependent on one international (or national) donor, a policy-change would not have 
affected the project substantially. In fact, the BIG Coalition has been formulated to 
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lobby for only one policy proposal: basic income grant. Therefore, policy change from 
the coalition perspective was not to be expected. If the project is currently “failing,” this 
is due to other reasons, and therefore the fourth proposal will not be discussed further in 
this thesis.12 The final claim states that “‘Success’ and ‘failure’ are policy-oriented 
judgments that obscure project effects”. Especially this claim for success is analyzed in 
the context of the BIG Coalition, as it was announced far before the BIG pilot project 
was  concluded  at  the  end  of  2009.   In  conclusion,  the  final  part  of  the  results  chapter  
takes a look at the transformation of the BIG Coalition into a development organization 
from the viewpoint of policy and practice. (Mosse 2005: 14-19.) 
2.8 Research Question 
I have presented above the theoretical background of this thesis. It includes concepts of 
organization, non-governmental organizations, coalition, organizational environment 
and stakeholders, resource dependence perspective and social legitimacy, as well as 
propositions about policy and practice. Based on these concepts, the research question 
is: How has the Namibian BIG Coalition been formed and transformed during the 
time period between 2003 and 2009? A number of supporting questions are included 
in the study. These are: What kind of an organization the BIG Coalition is? How have 
the BIG proposal and the BIG Coalition been formed in respect to critical events? How 
is social legitimacy maintained in the work of the BIG Coalition? Each part of the 
results answers to this question from its own perspective. First, however, I will present 
the methodology for data collection and its analysis. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Case Study and Fact Perspective 
This thesis is an intrinsic case study concerning the basic income grant proposal in 
Namibia. The case described here is unique, as it analyzes the work of a specific 
coalition and its actions in a specific environment. This is not to say that certain 
findings could not be applied elsewhere, but to remind that, the study proposes that the 
characteristics as a whole are unique to this specific case. The approach to the work of 
18 
 
the BIG Coalition is inspired by Annelise Riles, who describes her ethnographic study 
on organizations working in Fiji. In her book The network inside out, she shows that a 
network itself (or in this case a coalition) can be the focal point in the research of 
development projects (Riles 2000).  
Typical to case study approach, the data for this thesis was collected in a number of 
ways. First, I collected newspaper articles from newspapers and magazines, secondly I 
conducted interviews, and thirdly I visited the BIG village and did observations there. 
Naturally, in addition to this, I collected background material of Namibia and followed 
the discussion in media as well as reviewed relevant literature. 
According to Alasuutari (1999), fact perspective as a research method has three 
characteristics. First, this perspective differentiates between the real world, and the 
claims made from this world. Second, the perspective assists in evaluating the 
truthfulness of specific information. Third, the perspective understands the real world in 
everyday terms. Alasuutari illustrates fact perspective by drawing a picture, where an 
eye looks into the real world through the lens of the collected data.13 (1999: 90-92.) 
The fact perspective will be used in this case study to analyze the BIG Coalition and its 
work.  I  will  mostly  rely  on  the  evidence  perspective  when  analyzing  the  data.  This  
perspective understands the information collected as a testimony of the reality. Only 
with part of the observations, I rely on the indicator perspective. This means that I 
understand the observations as indicating certain things from the real world, but do not 
analyze everything solely as a testimony of the reality. (Alasuutari 1999: 95-96.) 
The case study methodology was chosen for this research due to the nature of the basic 
income proposal in Namibia: it provides a specific case, where the lines for the research 
have been relatively easy to draw. Fact perspective assists in analyzing the data of this 
case study. Next, I will present the data sets, and discuss the methodology in their 
context. Possible limitations concerning the methodology will also be discussed. 
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Interviews 
The interviews were conducted mostly during the first field work period in 2008. These 
eighteen interviews are primarily collected from the representatives of different 
organizations supporting the BIG proposal. Other group of interviews is collected from 
the inhabitants of Omitara/Otjivero village. The interviews were semi-structured, and 
they range from a short, five-minute chat to very detailed two-hour conversations. This 
might tell about the willingness or unwillingness of the interviewees to answer my 
questions. However, the motivations of the interviewees will not be speculated upon 
here, although the analysis of the interviews will be presented in the results. 
Approximately half of the interviews are recorded and transcribed, whereas the others 
were written down in detail 
The analysis of these interviews proposes how different actors perceive the basic 
income grant proposal, and how the BIG Coalition is structured. From the interviews 
conducted in Omitara, I wanted to find out especially how the people of the village see 
the  prospects  of  the  funding  of  the  BIG.  In  brief,  the  aim  of  the  interviews  is  to  
understand the structure of the BIG Coalition, to assist in conducting stakeholder 
analysis, and analyzing the relationship with the environment of the organization. 
Furthermore, the interviews assist in the analysis of the social legitimacy of the BIG 
Coalition. 
There are certain limitations in this data set. First, my method of interviewing developed 
in the process, and the first interviews are not of as high quality as the ones conducted 
later. Second, not all the interviewees were familiar with the concept of basic income 
and therefore I found myself from the position, where I explained the concept to the 
interviewee, who then formed an opinion on the subject, and answered my questions. 
Third, as the interviewing methods, also the detailed research question evolved in the 
research process, and this might have affected some of the interviews. 
Newspapers and Magazines 
Namibian newspapers have quite extensive online archives, and therefore I was able to 
find articles from several years back. It is my understanding that the coalition members 
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tried  to  accompany the  journalists  as  often  as  possible  when they  went  to  the  village.  
Therefore, extensive analysis of the situation of the village and the experiment cannot 
be searched for in these articles and one needs to analyze them critically. However, 
these articles provide the chronological backbone of the events that occurred before, 
during, and after the BIG project. The articles published in newspapers New Era and the 
Namibian are analyzed in this thesis. Some articles in the daily German-speaking 
newspaper, Allgemeine Zeitung, are also analyzed. 
The relations with the environment can be analyzed by studying the articles from the 
newspapers mentioned above. The search for social legitimacy is also analyzed within 
this context, as I will look into the spokespeople of the coalition. Finally, these articles 
will also provide the chronological background for different events during the 
development of the BIG Coalition, and the transformation to the development NGO. 
To my understanding, this source of information is quite reliable and I believe fact 
perspective provides necessary information on many events during the development of 
the basic income proposal. However, there are two points I want to make in relation to 
the newspaper articles as a data set. First, due to language constraints I have been 
restricted to mainly concentrate on the English-speaking articles. Second, as the articles 
are written by a handful of journalists, it is possible that their personal opinions are to 
certain extent reflected in this material. 
Observations and Background Material 
This data set includes general observations, informal discussions, and meetings with 
different people of Omitara village. Even though my research was not ethnographic, 
certain aspects from this approach were applied in the research. These include detailed 
observations and writing of memos twice a day, while staying in Omitara village. The 
observations provide valuable knowledge concerning the situation of the people staying 
in the village, and assist in understanding the environment, where the BIG Coalition 
works. Background material includes all such material relevant to the thesis, which is 
not included in the other data sets. An example of this includes brochures and other 
notes. 
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There are certain limitations within the observations and background material. As I had 
not stayed in the village for a long period of time, the observations are written from an 
outsider’s point of view. My interpretation of some events may be incorrect due to the 
lack of familiarity of the context of the village. On the other hand, I had been in 
Namibia for quite some time before going to Omitara, and therefore I was able to 
understand the culture of the village to a certain extent. Second, the background 
material consists of various kinds of materials, and therefore it is quite scattered. 
However, this material works together with the other data, and on its part assists in 
understanding the work of the BIG Coalition as a whole. 
3.2 Data Analysis 
Data analysis attempts to engage the theoretical background presented above, and the 
data collected in methods presented above into a dialogue, which brings out the results 
of this research. For the data analysis, the interviews were transcribed. The key points 
from the interviews were highlighted (ie. those parts of the discussions that concern the 
BIG), and specific parts of the newspaper articles were also highlighted (these include 
for example the persons representing the coalition). These newspaper articles, 
interviews and background material were all used in setting up the timeline of the key 
events in the development of the BIG Coalition and the BIG proposal in Namibia. The 
background material gained from the homepages of the Namibian and South African 
BIG Coalitions, in addition to the publications of the coalitions and people closely 
affiliated  to  it,  were  used  in  looking  at  the  background  of  the  BIG  proposal  in  South  
Africa. The newspaper articles, interviews, and the observation material from the pilot 
project village were used in analyzing the relationship between the coalition and its 
environment as well as defining the position of the coalition and its work in the context 
of national and international development discourse. 
3.3 Research Ethics 
Research ethics should be carefully considered, when conducting a field research in 
development studies. The most important aspect of this is the study of vulnerable 
groups. Liamputtong and Ezzy (2005: 204) define several vulnerable groups that 
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include specific groups of people such as homeless, children, severely ill, sick, sex 
workers, and ethnic minorities. They remind that the list is not exhaustive (ibid.) and it 
is indeed possible to define a larger number of vulnerable groups in the field of 
development studies. At least one vulnerable group can be identified in my research. 
This group consists of the people living in Omitara/Otjivero informal settlement area. 
These people were often uneducated and faced numerous challenges with their daily 
lives. 
In this research the vulnerable group mentioned above was carefully approached. One 
of the most important things was to have a translator to assist with the interviews. This 
was to ensure that the purpose of the study was clear to the interviewee. It was 
important to convey that the discussions were anonymous, and that I was working 
independently  from  the  BIG  Coalition,  or  for  example  from  the  government  as  well.  
During the second visit to the village in 2009, small pieces of paper explaining the 
purpose of the research in English and including my contact details, was given to the 
interviewee. After the interviews of the second visit, the interviewees were given small 
telephone vouchers as a token of gratitude. These vouchers are commonly used in 
Namibia  and  they  enable  one  to  make  a  phone  call  for  some minutes,  or  to  send  few 
SMS messages. 
Liamputtong and Ezzy, referring to a number of studies, point out different factors that 
may hinder the research of vulnerable groups. They mention a ”snow ball effect” which 
is not functioning when collecting information with the vulnerable groups, as people 
might protect each other, and thereby deny the access to the source of information 
(2005: 214). The lack of this effect could be observed when I began the research 
concerning the BIG project. First, I had hoped to be able to collect information from the 
representatives of the coalition. However, they strongly recommended that I would not 
go to the pilot project village, and were not either willing to share their own information 
with me. They were not either interested in taking me into their research group14. 
Secondly, during my stay at the Omitara/Otjivero village, the effect was not taking 
place. During the second visit, a representative of the BIG Village Committee told us 
not to interview people without the presence of the representative of the committee, as 
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otherwise people could say wrong things concerning the BIG project (Omitara 
20.6.2009). This was a clear sign of the protection of possible informants. 
The chapters above have explained the theoretical background for the thesis. This 
chapter has presented methodology for the research, and finally discussed the research 
ethics of the study. The following chapters of the thesis present the data together with 
its analysis. As shortly described in the theoretical background, first the structure of the 
Basic Income Grant Coalition will be described, and the coalition with its stakeholders 
and environment will be analyzed. Thereafter the critical events in the formation of the 
BIG Coalition will be analyzed. After this, the analysis investigates the clashes between 
organization and its environment, from the viewpoint of social legitimacy. Finally, the 
transformation of the church-based NGO-coalition into a development coalition will be 
analyzed from the viewpoint of policy and practice. 
4. Coalition and its Environment 
4.1 Central Elements of the Chapter 
In this chapter I present the analysis of the BIG Coalition as an organization. The 
structure of the coalition will be presented and analyzed in the stakeholder analysis. The 
organizational environment will be discussed in this concept, and two examples from 
the environment will be presented. These two cases assist in understanding the structure 
of the coalition and its relationship with different stakeholders and the environment. The 
first  case  analyzes  the  relation  of  the  Namibian  BIG  Coalition  and  the  South  African  
Coalition, and the second one concentrates on the details of a workshop conducted by 
the Namibian BIG Coalition to the Namibian NGOs. 
The analysis looks into the internal structure of the coalition, to its environment, as well 
as to the relation of the Namibian proposal to its South African counterpart. Therefore, 
this  chapter  will  discuss  the  formation  and  the  work  of  the  coalition,  as  well  as  the  
relationship between the coalition and its environment. Central concepts in this chapter 
are coalition, environment and stakeholders.  This  chapter  seeks  an  answer  to  the  
question: How have the BIG proposal and the BIG Coalition been formed? 
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4.2 Coalition as an Organization 
As will  be  seen  from the  example  of  the  BIG Coalition,  a  coalition  can  be  set  up  for  
conducting advocacy work and for lobbying the government. According to Yanacopulos 
(2005), coalitions are characterized by permanent staff members as well as a permanent 
membership base. In comparison with networks, coalitions also have “broader strategic 
aims” (2005). Roberts-DeGennaro (1986), in turn, views coalitions as actors of political 
advocacy. Therefore, coalitions are formed by interacting organizations, which are 
“guided by a purpose” (1986: 309). Furthermore, the coalition needs to be guided by a 
purpose, and the benefits of the coalition membership need to be clear to the member 
organizations. These characteristics differentiate coalitions from other, more loosely 
organized networks (ibid.). 
From  the  definitions  above,  a  number  of  characteristics  of  coalitions  can  be  defined.  
According to these, coalitions should have permanent links and staff members, 
permanent membership base, broad strategic aims and specific purpose for the 
activities, and finally, coalitions should be able to show clear benefits to the member 
organizations. The next part will take a look at the member organizations of the BIG 
Coalition, the underlying principles behind the South African and Namibian coalitions, 
and the linkages between the organizations and the coalition. The four criteria 
mentioned above will also be used in the analysis. 
Members of the Namibian BIG Coalition 
The Namibian Basic Income Coalition is a platform for organizations that support the 
idea of Basic Income Grant in the country. These organizations include Council of 
Churches  in  Namibia  (CCN),  Namibian  NGO  Forum  (NANGOF),  National  Union  of  
Namibian Workers (NUNW) and Namibia Network of AIDS Service Organizations 
(NANASO) (Basic  Income Grant  Coalition  2008a:  13).   In  addition  to  these  umbrella  
organizations, individual organizations include Labour Resource and Research Institute 
(LaRRI) and Legal Assistance Centre (LAC) (ibid.). “[T]he Evangelical Lutheran 
Church in the Republic of Namibia (ELCRN) with its Desk for Social Development 
(DfSD) is the legal administrative and financial home responsible for the 
implementation of the BIG Pilot Project on behalf of the BIG Coalition” (Basic Income 
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Grant Coalition 2008a: 13). National Youth Council (NYC) and the Church Alliance for 
Orphans (CAFO) have joined the coalition recently (!Hoasës 2009a, Allgemeine 
Zeitung 2009). 
These organizations vary in size and their role in the Namibian society differs. The 
Council of Churches in Namibia is an ecumenical alliance of Christian churches in 
Namibia, and in 2008 it was chaired by Bishop Sindano from the Evagelical Lutheran 
Church in Namibia (ELCIN) (Transformation Namibia 2008). The supportive work for 
the BIG Coalition is mainly conducted in the congregations and for example offerings 
are donated for the Pilot Project through the church (NANGOF 2008, Tjaronda 2008d). 
CCN is an ecumenical alliance, and therefore it may be challenging to specify the role 
of the churches such as ELCRN and ELCIN, in comparison with the role of the CCN in 
the coalition. When interviewed, the representative of CCN and ELCIN did not specify 
the different roles of the individual churches and the coalition (CCN 2008). This 
indicates that the CCN has a permanent role in the coalition. It has also been a member 
since the very beginning. However, the benefits of the coalition membership to the CCN 
are not specified. The role of the individual organizations in CCN, in regard to the BIG 
Coalition, is not specified. 
NANGOF, Namibian NGO Forum, is one of the umbrella organizations in the coalition. 
The organization aims at facilitating policies which increase the participation of civil 
society, gives out information, and has programs that strengthen the capabilities of non-
governmental organizations (NANGOF 2007). According to the representative of 
NANGOF, the role of the organization is not to conduct research concerning the BIG, 
but it is prepared to help out in the field work and funding (NANGOF 2008). 
Furthermore, NANGOF is not unified with the opinions concerning Basic Income 
Grant, but according to the representative, the debate is positive (ibid.). Some member 
organizations of NANGOF were not, however, supportive to the idea, rather the other 
way around, and not even in a positive manner. For example the representative of 
Namibia Housing Action Group, referred to the idea of Basic Income Grant as totally 
opposite to the underlying values of her organization (Namibia Housing Action Group 
2008). The representative of Forum for the Future mentioned that BIG might create 
dependency (Forum for the Future 2008). NANGOF has been a member of the coalition 
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since its foundation, and it is a permanent member. The benefits of the membership are 
not  very  clear,  as  the  opinions  concerning  the  BIG  proposal  vary  within  the  member  
organizations of NANGOF. 
According to Henning Melber, there was a demand for worker’s unions in Namibia after 
the repressive system of apartheid (Melber 1983). In addition to this, the left-wing 
political rhetoric was also supportive of the organization of the working people and 
furthermore, as the mining industry sector grew in Namibia, there was a new group of 
working black people ready to demand better labor contracts. National Union of 
Namibian Workers (NUNW) was formed in 1970's (ibid.). This organization is closely 
related to the Labour Resource and Research Institute, LaRRI. When I contacted the 
organization for the interview concerning the role of NUNW in the BIG Coalition, the 
organization referred me to LaRRI. It is therefore very challenging to state whether the 
organization has a permanent membership within the coalition, as it has not publicly 
been a very active member. Furthermore, the benefits of the membership are hard to 
define.15 
LaRRI is the research organization for trade unions and provides “specifically labour-
related research and training services to the labour movement” (LaRRI 2006). The 
representative of LaRRI is very active in the BIG Coalition, and therefore it seems that 
the organization is a very permanent member of the coalition. The benefits to the 
organization might include the visibility the membership has provided, although this 
was not mentioned in the interview. 
Namibia Network of AIDS Service Organizations, NANASO is a network organization 
in the field of HIV/AIDS. It was formed in 1991 and it provides services to non-
governmental organizations, faith-based organizations, and community-based 
organizations (NANASO 2008a). The representative of the organization mentioned that 
the umbrella organization covers more than 800 organizations and that it has an 
effective network for information sharing (NANASO 2008b). According to the 
representative, this gives the organization a specific role in BIG Coalition, since 
questions with HIV/AIDS are closely linked to the issues of poverty (ibid.). As with the 
previous  organizations,  NANASO  seems  to  be  a  permanent  member  of  the  coalition.  
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According to the representative of the organization, the members of the umbrella 
organizations would benefit from the BIG, and therefore it is possible to deduct that the 
membership of the coalition is beneficial to NANASO as well. 
Legal Assistance Centre (LAC) concentrates on the protection of “the human rights of 
all Namibians” and was formed in 1988 (LAC 2008). It has a head office in Windhoek 
and two regional offices and the organization works in five areas which include 
litigation, information and advice, education and training, research as well as law 
reform and advocacy (LAC 2008). As with the case of NUNW, it seems that LAC does 
not have an active role in the BIG Coalition, and only the AIDS and Law unit ALU of 
the LAC is a member of the coalition (LAC 2006). Therefore, it is very difficult to 
define if the organization is a permanent member of the coalition, or if it benefits from 
the membership. 
According to the Secretary General Mandela Kapere of the National Youth Council of 
Namibia, the Council is well known as a social justice movement and a majority of 
Namibian unemployed are youngsters (!Hoases 2009b). Therefore, the organization 
decided  to  join  the  BIG  Coalition  (ibid.).  Kapere  saw  the  BIG  as  another  option  for  
“failed predatory capitalism,” and suggested that the state-led social development 
should be enhanced (ibid.). As one of the newest member organizations of the coalition, 
the membership of the NYC cannot yet be perceived as permanent. However, it is quite 
possible this will change in due course. The benefits of the membership are not as yet 
clear. 
The English-speaking newspapers in Namibia did not announce the joining of Church 
Alliance for Orphans (CAFO) to the BIG Coalition. The CAFO homepage does not 
mention this either, but the Quarterly Newsletter of the organization published in 
December 2009 states the following: “CAFO has officially joined the Basic Income 
Grant Coalition at its recent AFM. CAFO is confident that this process would change 
the face of unemployment and poverty in this country, bringing hope for the orphan and 
the vulnerable children” (CAFO 2009). According to this statement, the benefits of the 
membership would include further support to the organization, as its target group would 
benefit from the grant. However, the membership itself is not the benefit, but the 
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introduction of basic income on the national level. As was the case with the NYC, the 
membership  of  CAFO  in  the  BIG  Coalition  does  not  yet  seem  to  be  permanent,  but  
might change in due course. However, the organization has not been very visible in the 
coalition, as not even the entry was publicly announced. 
The information on permanent staff members of the coalition is not public, which 
hinders the analysis of the organizational structure of the BIG Coalition. However, Dirk 
and Claudia Haarmann are working for the Desk for Social Development under the 
ELCRN  Church,  and  they  are  mentioned  as  the  project  directors  in  the  BIG  pilot  
project. Therefore, the coalition seems to have permanent staff members. However, as 
the pilot project is being concluded, it is difficult to say whether they will continue to 
work for the BIG Coalition. The broad strategic aim of the coalition is to convince the 
government of Namibia to introduce the basic income in the country. This is also the 
purpose of the activities of the coalition.  
The coalition clearly fulfills at least two of the requirements mentioned in the beginning 
of this chapter: The coalition has permanent staff members and specific purpose for the 
activities. As discussed in this chapter, the fulfillment of the other requirements is more 
questionable. The membership base is not necessarily permanent, and it is unclear 
whether the member organizations benefit from the membership of the BIG Coalition. 
Therefore I am arguing that the BIG Coalition is not theoretically clearly a coalition, but 
may also be understood as a network of organizations. However, in order to avoid 
confusion, I will continue to use the term coalition, when referring to the Namibian BIG 
Coalition. 
This thesis often refers to the viewpoint or the opinion of “the coalition”. However, 
most  often  the  statements  are  not  made  in  the  name  of  the  whole  coalition  (with  the  
exception of few press releases and booklets), but through a spokesperson representing 
the coalition. The role of these spokespersons will be discussed in more detail in the 
following chapters, but for now, it suffices to mention the loudest spokespersons16 of 
the coalition. These include Bishop Kameeta, Dirk Haarmann, Herbert Jauch, Claudia 
Haarmann, and Uhuru Dempers. To be coherent with the newspaper articles, the 
opinion of these people will be considered as the official opinion of the BIG Coalition. 
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Coalition – a Permanent Organization? 
It is challenging to strictly define the BIG Coalition in the terms of Yanacopulos. This 
coalition might be merely a single-issue advocacy network than a coalition with a 
permanent membership base. Furthermore, the coalition does not have broad strategic 
aims, but it is very much concentrated on one issue, lobbying for the basic income. 
Some of the member organizations have very strong linkages to the BIG Coalition, but 
others are more or less in the outskirts of the organization. The organization is definitely 
“guided by a purpose,” a requirement proposed by Roberts-DeGennaro. It is not sure 
however, how well all the member organizations “understand why being a member of 
the coalition is in their best interest,” this is the case especially with the member 
organizations of the umbrella bodies. 
It is possible that when building the BIG Coalition, the impression of strong linkages 
and a permanent membership base has been given. This provides the coalition with 
more legitimacy in the society, as it can claim to have a very large support group in the 
background. As it will be seen in the case of the BIG workshop, the coalition is able to 
gain support within the civil society sector. However, mobilizing this support, and 
expanding it to the other sectors of the society, such as to government and researchers, 
has been a challenge for the BIG Coalition. This will be discussed in later chapters, 
when the clashes between the coalition and its environment are analyzed in more detail. 
Before that, the stakeholders of the BIG Coalition and its environment will be analyzed. 
4.3 Environment and Stakeholder Analysis 
This part of the analysis will discuss the environment of the BIG Coalition. Hatch and 
Cunliffe warn that the line between the organization and its environment is not easy to 
draw. In this part, I will define the key stakeholders and stakeholders of  the  BIG  
Coalition.  Thereafter, I will place these stakeholders into three levels of organizational 
environment presented by Hatch and Cunliffe: “the interorganizational network, the 
general environment and the international environment” (Hatch & Cunliffe 2006: 
66). These, in turn, can be divided into subcategories (ibid.). However, the division into 
subcategories is not made here, but the division into these three categories assists in 
understanding the role of different stakeholders within the context of BIG Coalition. 
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The final part of the chapter will present two cases of the organizational environment. 
The first one gives an example of similarities between another organization and the BIG 
Coalition, a case from the interorganizational network. The second case analyses the 
relationship between the BIG Coalition and organizations from both the 
interorganizational network and from the general environment. 
Key stakeholders are considered as crucial actors for the functions of the organization, 
although they are not part of it. Stakeholders are  naturally  not  as  crucial  as  key  
stakeholders, but they are still related to the organization under scrutiny. According to 
Hatch and Cunliffe, “every organization interacts with other members of its 
environment” (2006: 66). Those individuals, groups, or organizations that have a key 
role in the context of the organization, are stakeholders, according to the narrow 
definition of the term (ibid.). As mentioned above, it is not always clear who is part of 
the organization, and who is a stakeholder, and belongs to the environment. 
Stakeholders of the BIG Coalition 
The role of the organizations under the umbrella bodies – CCN, NANASO, NANGOF 
and NUNW – is challenging to define. For example some of the organizations were not 
supportive of the BIG proposal (NHAG 2008), did not strongly oppose but were not 
active in the coalition (Penduka 2008), or had critical opinions concerning the proposal 
(FFF  2008).  These  organizations  are  clearly  not  part  of  the  coalition,  but  they  are  
stakeholders in relation to it. The role of the ELCRN Church is more complicated as for 
example Bishop Zephania Kameeta of the ELCRN has been one of the key figures in 
promoting the grant (see Tjaronda 2006b, Isaacs 2007a, b, c, d, and 2008C among 
others). For the sake of consistency, ELCRN is not considered part of the coalition, as 
Namibia Housing Action Group, Penduka, or Forum for the Future are neither part of 
the  BIG  Coalition.  ELCRN  is  working  in  the  coalition  as  a  member  of  the  CCN  of  
Namibia, and the latter organizations are related to the coalition through NANGOF. 
Because of the visible role of the ELCRN Church in the context of the BIG Coalition, it 
is considered as a key stakeholder in the analysis. Although not clearly stating it in the 
statement for the BIG, the Desk for Social Development of the ELCRN is the secretary 
of the coalition. DfSD is considered being part of the organizational structure of the 
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BIG Coalition17. National Youth Council and Church Alliance for Orphans are 
considered as being part of the coalition, after they have announced their entry. 
The organizations mentioned above are not the only members with an unclear 
relationship to the BIG Coalition. The coalition claims that a “team of international 
renowned research experts assists and advises on the research methodology” (Basic 
Income Grant Coalition 2008a). Furthermore, a number of international organizations 
have provided financial assistance to the coalition. Are these two groups part of the 
organization itself, or part of the environment? Because they have a significant role in 
the work of the coalition, but they are not mentioned as the signatories of the BIG 
Coalition, they are considered as key stakeholders in this analysis. 
How about the BIG Committee in Otjivero/Omitara village? The coalition says that “It 
is important to stress that this [setting up the Village Committee for BIG] was an 
entirely organic process initiated and developed by the community itself without outside 
interference” (Basic Income Grant Coalition 2008: 44) but a member of this Committee 
said that “Actually what they told us was to establish a committee from ourselves” (BIG 
Committee 12.6.2008b). If the BIG Coalition wanted to establish a Village Committee 
to be its structural counterpart in the pilot project village, then that committee could be 
considered part of the organization. On the other hand, if the people of the village 
decided to set up the committee themselves, it would not have this position. As only the 
BIG Coalition members are officially mentioned as part of the coalition, it will be 
considered the starting point for this study as well. Therefore, also this group is 
considered as a key stakeholder in relation with the BIG Coalition. 
Other Namibian NGOs, often members of one of the umbrella bodies of the coalition, 
have more indirect influence to the work of the coalition, and are therefore considered 
as stakeholders at this point. The government of Namibia can also be categorized as a 
stakeholder. Furthermore, South African BIG Coalition is categorized as a stakeholder 
of the BIG Coalition. 
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Three Levels of Organizational Environment 
The interorganizational network refers to the organization under scrutiny, and to the 
organizations surrounding it. These organizations communicate with each other, and 
therefore form a network. It is important to note that not only NGOs are understood as 
organizations here: official government organizations may also form a part of this 
network. As other organizations than the members of the BIG Coalition do have close 
relation to the BIG Pilot project and the BIG proposal in Namibia, the stakeholder 
analysis and an interorganizational network analysis is vital for the study. In this study, 
the interorganizational network includes the BIG Coalition and stakeholders related to 
the coalition. These are the member organizations of those umbrella bodies that are part 
of the BIG Coalition, and other civil society organizations of Namibia. The government 
of Namibia can also be categorized as part of the interorganizational network. 
Furthermore, the South African BIG Coalition has had special influence to its Namibian 
counterpart and therefore is also a part of the interorganizational network. 
The international environment in turn, refers to the organizations surrounding the initial 
organization, outside its national borders. The donor organizations can be categorized as 
stakeholders in the international environment, with the other international actors such 
as the international community contributing to the debate. The difference between the 
South African and other international organizations lies in their relationship with the 
Namibian project. 
According to Hatch and Cunliffe, it is vital to understand and analyze the “conditions 
and trends in the general environment in addition to the interorganizational network in 
order to fully appreciate the links between an organization and its environment” (Hatch 
& Cunliffe 2006: 68). The general environment includes those stakeholders between the 
interorganizational network and international environment. The “general environment” 
refers to the rest of the environment, after the international environment and the 
interorganizational network have been defined. Although the government of Namibia is 
part of the interorganizational network, the country and the society surrounding the BIG 
Coalition is part of the general environment. 
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Interorganizational Linkages to the Coalition 
The  umbrella  bodies  that  are  members  of  the  BIG  Coalition  claim  to  represent  their  
member organizations as well. However, these member organizations are not always 
publicly supporting the BIG, or they might oppose the idea. This was the case with the 
NHAG. Veronika DeKlerk from Women’s Action for Development (WAD) has stated 
the following “While WAD supports the forthcoming legislation that would pave the 
way for a poverty grant to the needy, the organization proposes that it should be handled 
as an interim measure which should be phased out after some years to discourage 
dependency among the poor” (Isaacs 2005b). The BIG Coalition has interpreted this 
claim to oppose the proposal (Brakwater 2009). 
When interviewed, for example the representative of NANASO mentioned that the 
organization is part of the Board of the coalition, which is simultaneously the executive 
(NANASOb 2008). However, NANASO, LAC and NUNW have been very quiet in the 
newspapers. The representatives of the BIG Coalition are most often Bishop Kameeta or 
Dirk Haarmann, both from the ELCRN, representing CCN or DfSD in the coalition 
respectively. Herbert Jauch from LaRRI has also been an active spokesperson in the 
coalition. The linkages of the organizations to the BIG Coalition vary. The member 
organizations of NANGOF such as Penduka, WAD, NHAG and FFF have a number of 
opinions concerning the BIG proposal, and in some of these organizations the topic is 
discussed more intensively than in others (Penduka 2008, FFF 2008, NHAG 2008). Not 
all the member organizations of the BIG Coalition have strong relationship with other 
representatives of the coalition. 
BIG Platform in South Africa and in Namibia: Comparison 
Now I will turn to analyze the similarities between the BIG Coalitions of South Africa 
and Namibia. The aim is to shed light on the special relationship between these two 
organizations. The BIG Platform provides an example of these similar elements 
between these two organizations. As mentioned above, the South African BIG Coalition 
is a stakeholder of the Namibian BIG Coalition in the interorganizational network. This 
is only one example of a large number of similarities between these two coalitions. 
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The organizations of South African BIG Coalition agree that the introduction of basic 
income grant should be the “key intervention to combat poverty and to improve the 
lives of the majority of South Africans” (Appendix 1). The agreement states that more 
than half of South African population live in poverty, and demonstrates five ways in 
which this will be done. These include the provision of minimum level of income, 
providing the poorest households to meet the basic needs, stimulation of economic 
development, promotion of “family and community stability,” as well as “affirming and 
supporting the inherent dignity of all”. The fundamental principles of the proposal 
include “Universal Coverage, - - Relationship to existing grants: It should expand the 
social security net. - - Amount: The grant should be no less than R100 per person per 
month18 -  -  Delivery Mechanisms: Payments should be facilitated through Public 
Institutions. - - Financing: A substantial part of the cost  of  the  grant  should  be  
recovered progressively through the tax system” (Appendix 1). This agreement can 
be attained from the homepage of the South African BIG Coalition and it is signed by 
twelve organizations. This homepage also provides the constitution of the organization, 
approved and accepted 4 December 2003 (South African BIG Coalition 2003).  
The Namibian version states three main issues: “Namibia has extremely high levels of 
poverty and the highest incidence of income inequality in the world. - - poverty is a 
contributing factor to the spread of HIV/AIDS and thereby undermining economic 
security, and, at the same time exacerbating poverty. - - the Basic Income Grant is a 
necessity to reduce poverty and to promote economic empowerment, freeing the 
productive potential of the people currently trapped in the vicious and deadly cycle of 
poverty” (Appendix 2). This leads to the four-point principles of the proposition: “1. We 
agree that every Namibian should receive a Basic Income Grant until she or he 
becomes eligible for a government pension at 60 years. 2. The level of the Basic Income 
Grant should be not less than N$ 100 per person per month. 3. The Basic Income 
Grant should be an unconditional grant to every Namibian. 4. The costs for the Basic 
Income  Grant  should  be  recovered  through  a  combination  of  progressively designed 
tax reforms.” (Own emphases, appendix 2). The undersigned organizations include 
CCN, NUNW, NANGOF, LAC and LaRRI. 
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The  BIG  Coalition  of  Namibia  has  added  two  perspectives  to  the  South  African  
proposal. First, it mentions the high level of inequality in the country, and secondly, the 
relationship between poverty and HIV/AIDS is mentioned. Not all parts are as detailed 
as in the South African proposal. For example, the Namibian version does not explicitly 
state that the level of social assistance should not drop due to the grant. The requirement 
for inflation indexing is not mentioned, and the delivery mechanisms are not proposed. 
Tax reform is mentioned in the Namibian version, but the aspect of solidarity and the 
suggestion for new measures in increasing revenue are left out. The number of signatory 
organizations is far less in the Namibian proposal, but this might simply be due to the 
smaller number of civil society organizations in the country. The constitution of the 
Namibian BIG Coalition is not provided. (Appendices 1 and 2.) 
When comparing the two “platforms,” it is not difficult to see that the two organizations 
are closely linked to each other. The above examples stress the similarities between the 
proposals,  but  there  are  other  similarities  as  well.  The  whole  organizational  form  of  
coalition is chosen for the promotion of the basic income grant. The signatories include 
similar kind of organizations, and both coalitions have published their aims in similar 
kind of forms. As will be seen later, some of the BIG proponents of South Africa have 
also been active in Namibia. All this indicates that the South African BIG Coalition has 
a very special connection to the Namibian BIG Coalition and it indeed seems possible 
that  the  South  African  BIG  Coalition  has  provided  model  for  the  Namibian  BIG  
Coalition for organizing its activities. 
Workshop for the Lobbyists – Securing the Support of the NGO Sector 
This part of the chapter sheds light on the relationship between the BIG Coalition and 
the interorganizational environment, the stakeholders from the Namibian NGO-sector. 
Secondly, it assists in analyzing the structure of the coalition by taking a look at the 
spokespeople. It asks who has the central role, and what are the methods used to convey 
the central message forwards. It also gives an idea of the behavior of the BIG Coalition 
when it comes to the critical comments towards the proposal, although this will be 
analyzed in detail in later chapters. 
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The spokespeople of the BIG Coalition are those who discuss the proposal with the 
wider audience. First, of course the coalition needed to make sure that the media and the 
government do know what is included in the BIG proposal. As the pilot project started, 
the members of the Omitara/Otjivero village needed to be informed. Finally, it was the 
time for the civil society and the wider audience to get involved. For this, the coalition 
organized workshops, where the representatives of the civil society were invited. I was 
lucky to be able to participate in one of these workshops (this was actually the first, and 
probably the largest one) organized in a lodge some 30km from the capital city, 
Windhoek in July 2009. 
As workshops are a common practice among different organizations in Namibia, it was 
quite natural for the BIG Coalition to organize one for the representatives of the 
member organizations, as well as to other Namibian stakeholders. The purpose of the 
workshop was to train campaigners for the lobbying of BIG. The organizations included 
CAFO,  NYC,  FFF,  Namibia  Planned  Parenthood  Association  NAPPA,  NANASO,  
Ministry of Health and Social Services, Women’s Solidarity Namibia, P.E.A.C.E 
Centre, Namibia Paralegal Association (NPA) and Community Empowerment 
Development Action (CEDA). Altogether approximately 50 people attended the three-
day workshop. I was present on the second and third days, when the more formal 
program took place. The speakers in the workshop included Bishop Kameeta, Uhuru 
Dempers from Nangof Trust19, Dirk Haarmann, and Herbert Jauch. Hilma Shindondola-
Mote was also present. Bishop Kameeta gave an emotional opening speech, after which 
Uhuru Dempers told that the intention was to discuss BIG also critically. This was to be 
done in order to ensure that everybody would be able to answer to the critical questions 
presented towards the proposal. (Brakwater 2009.) 
It was interesting to notice how the attitudes of the representatives of the organizations 
changed during this workshop. A number of critical points were raised in the 
discussions, and they received varying responses. At the beginning of the workshop, the 
participants were asked to pronounce their fears concerning the workshop. Among 
others, these included following: “too much disagreements between the participants, 
that not everybody agrees about the principles of the basic income grant, and that the 
BIG  proposal  would  be  mixed  with  the  party  politics”.  These  answers  reveal  that  
37 
 
although the participants of the workshop were outspoken to certain extent,  they were 
still afraid of the lack of consensus among each other. Although this exercise was done 
at the very beginning of the workshop, nobody questioned the BIG pilot project itself – 
neither its principles nor its outcomes. This indicates that the coalition had gained social 
legitimacy among the participant organizations. 
After the presentation by Herbert Jauch concerning poverty in Namibia, and a 
presentation of the BIG proposal by Dirk Haarmann, the participants were divided into 
groups. The groups were asked to discuss the positive effects of the basic income to the 
life of the people in Omitara/Otjivero village. The opening session of the final day was 
emotional and very positive towards the proposal. Participants could recap a number of 
figures presented during the previous day, and a number of addresses were made in 
support  of the BIG. One of the comments for example stated that this was the time to 
make history in the country. 
Finally, the participants were divided into different groups, and they were asked to 
come up with different strategies to promote the BIG proposal. My group consisted of 
the representatives of the NGOs (as other groups included members of church or 
government-based organizations), and a number of enthusiastic proposals were made. 
Documentary films, TV-commercials and panel discussions were proposed to be used 
when lobbying for the grant. Art, drama, music and business sector could also be used 
to convey the message. According to this group, it would also be important to educate 
more people for campaigning and to form pressure groups. (Brakwater 2009.) 
Despite the very innovative ideas by the enthusiastic participants, during the time period 
under scrutiny, none of these ideas had been taken forward by the BIG Coalition. It is of 
course possible that these have been taken up in individual attempts and private 
discussions, but for example newspapers or the homepage of the BIG Coalition do not 
indicate anything towards these kinds of activities. This suggests that the role of the 
interorganizational network in relation to the BIG Coalition is to support its activities, 
but not to actively take part in its work. 
In conclusion, a number of civil society organizations were very much interested in the 
BIG proposal, although not all of them had much information on the subject. The 
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workshop proved to be a very efficient way in promoting the idea and convincing the 
skeptics. The Coalition seems to have strong social legitimacy within the civil society 
organizations. None of the organizations attending the workshop openly questioned the 
work of the coalition. It was rather the opposite, as one participant wanted to thank the 
coalition  members  and  the  researchers  for  their  efforts.  The  criticism  towards  the  
coalition would have seemed impolite, as the coalition was providing the workshop 
including accommodation and catering. (Brakwater 2009.) 
4.4 Conclusion: Relations of the Coalition 
This chapter has presented the structure of the BIG Coalition, the central elements in the 
analysis of this form of an organization, as well as analyzed the environment and the 
stakeholders. Finally, two cases concerning the relations with the stakeholders have 
been presented. It was observed, that the BIG Coalition might also be understood as a 
network of organizations rather than a coalition. Members of the coalition do not always 
have close linkages to their own member organizations, and therefore the BIG Coalition 
can be understood as a network of organizations. However, to avoid confusion, the term 
“coalition” is used in this thesis. The BIG Coalition has built its relations with the 
environment in a number of ways. The first case showed the influence of South African 
BIG  Coalition  Platform  to  the  Namibian  Platform,  and  the  second  on  the  other  hand,  
described the influence of the Namibian coalition to a number of NGOs. The latter 
example showed how the representatives of the BIG Coalition use their power to prove 
their legitimacy in the society. The representatives are capable of convincing their 
audience when the largest part of it consists of the representatives of civil society. This 
legitimacy is questioned by government and researchers, which will be discussed later. 
For now, the BIG proposal itself will be discussed in more detail. 
5. Building the Coalition and Maintaining Social Legitimacy 
5.1 Fact Perspective in the Chronology of Key Events 
The earlier chapters have presented the members and stakeholders of the BIG Coalition. 
This chapter discusses the background of the Namibian BIG proposal in detail, and 
39 
 
provides a chronology of the critical events in the development of the organization. The 
key events in the formation of the coalition are discussed in order to analyze the change 
that has taken place within the BIG Coalition during the time period under scrutiny. The 
data in this chapter is analyzed from the “fact perspective” (Alasuutari 1999: 90), where 
the evidence is discussed critically, but it is primarily assumed to describe the truth. The 
aim of this chapter is to provide answer to the research question concerning the 
transformation of the coalition, as well as analyze the reasons behind this change. The 
chapter begins by brief description of the BIG proposal in South Africa, and thereafter 
presenting the Namibian proposal including the BIG pilot project in detail. 
5.2 BIG Proposal in South Africa 
Labour Input and the Taylor Committee 
According to Kumiko Makino, the universal BIG was brought up as a policy alternative 
for South Africa in the Presidential Jobs Summit in October 1998. The National 
Economic and Labour Council (NEDLAC) presented proposals gathered from its 
constituencies on South Africa’s job creation and fight for unemployment. The Labour 
input for this was the BIG proposal. The Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) had proposed a means-tested social assistance scheme earlier, but as the 
idea of universal grant began to gain support, COSATU mandated “researchers Claudia 
and Dirk Haarmann - - specifically to look at the option of the universal basic income 
grant - - To facilitate their research, COSATU set up a reference team including Viviene 
Taylor, who would chair the Taylor Committee two years later”. (Makino 2003: 14-15.) 
According to Neil Coleman, the research was conducted by Dirk and Claudia Haarmann 
(Coleman 2003: 139) who, as I have already mentioned, later became the key figures in 
the Namibian BIG Coalition. 
The Taylor Committee20, according to Kumiko Makino, was the fifth committee on 
social security policy reform since the end of the 1980s in South Africa. This 
Committee, compared to those of earlier ones, comprised of people closer to the labour 
movement, and of more members, than the earlier ones. For example Ravi Naidoo, the 
director of National Labour and Economic Development Institute (Naledi), “a labour 
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think tank” was part of the Taylor Committee. However, it was officially an expert 
Committee, and Naidoo only represented himself in it. According to Makino, a Cape 
Town based think tank, EPRI (Economic Policy Research Institute) was commissioned 
by Taylor Committee to “simulate the social, economic, and fiscal impact of a BIG”. 
(Makino 2003: 17.) 
A slightly different view to the work of the Taylor Committee is provided by Franco 
Brachiesi. According to him, “economic research, scenarios and stimulations were 
provided by various individuals and institutes, including labor-friendly Economic 
Policy Research Institute (EPRI), which had developed the model used for COSATU’s 
BIG proposal, the National Labour and Economic Development Institute (NALEDI), 
the  National  Institute  for  Economic  Policy  (NIEP),  and  researchers  Claudia  and  Dirk  
Haarmann. Among the international experts - - with the Committee was ILO economist 
and BIG supporter, Guy Standing.” (Barchiesi 2006: 12.) Pieter le Roux was also one of 
the Committee members, although he supported more the increase in Value Added Tax 
(VAT) as a source of funding for the grant (2006: 13). Later, le Roux was a member in 
the Namtax Consortium, which is claimed to be the initial proponent of basic income in 
Namibia.21 
BIG Coalition and the Proposal in South Africa 
The South African BIG Coalition was formed in 2001, and it included organizations 
connected  to  church,  labour,  human  rights  etc.  (South  African  BIG  Coalition  2003a.)  
The members of the South African BIG Coalition included COSATU, The Black Sash 
(doing the secretarial work for the Coalition), Community Law Centre, and a number of 
Christian organizations (Makino 2003: 26). Kumiko Makino specifically mentions the 
work  of  SACC,  as  the  organization  assumed  the  BIG  as  the  main  theme  for  its  
Christmas campaign of 2002 (ibid.). 
Guy Standing and Michael Samson (2003) have edited a comprehensive book A basic 
income grant for South Africa which discusses the basic income proposal in detail, and 
follows the lobbying for the grant in the country. It covers the questions of finance and 
influence to the poverty situation, as well as the requirements for the government to 
agree on the proposal. The preface for the book is provided by Achibishop Njongonkulu 
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Ndungane, arguing that The Kingdom [of Heaven] can be achieved by sharing, and that 
“[t]his book shows a way in which we can make that concrete” (Ndungane 2003: vii). A 
commentary is provided thereafter by COSATU, introducing the reader to the contents 
of the book (Vavi 2003: viii-x). However, it is critical towards the chapter written by 
Heidi Matisonn and Jeremy Seekings, as they see (contrary to the understanding of 
COSATU) the Democratic Alliance as supporters of BIG (2003: ix). Matisonn and 
Seekings  claim  that  the  proposal  might  not  be  the  most  significant  suggestion  for  
improving the situation of the workers, and they are also slightly pessimistic about the 
prospects of the proposal in South Africa (Matisonn & Seekings 2003: 70-72). To this, 
Vavi comments: “In the face of parliamentary public hearings - - in which every sector 
of civil society turned out to endorse the Basic Income Grant, in the light of increasing 
numbers of newspaper editors - - and in the light of the active mobilization of the Basic 
Income Grant coalition, pessimism appears to be more political choice than reasoned 
conclusion” (Vavi 2003: ix). The General Secretary also partly criticizes the chapter by 
Haroon Borat, because he “spins a perplexing economic analysis that turns reasoned 
conclusion upside down” (ibid.). The third comment for the book is provided by Sheena 
Duncan, “Patron of the Black Sash” (Duncan 2003: xi-xii). This comment is also very 
positive, and demands the South African government make the decision for the 
realization of the BIG.22 
The  commentaries  of  the  book  by  Standing  and  Samson  reveal  the  close  relationship  
between the authors and the basic income proposal in South Africa. One of the chapters 
of  the  book even  discusses  the  BIG Coalition  in  South  Africa.  The  representatives  of  
Black Sash, Isobe Frye and Karen Kallmann have written this chapter named The BIG 
coalition in South Africa: Making it happen. Other authors of the book include Claudia 
Haarmann, Dirk Haarmann, Kenneth MacQuene, Ingrid van Niekerk, Gilbert Khathi, 
Oliver Babson, Allison Stevens, Pieter le Roux and Neil Coleman, most of them also 
active members in the South African BIG Coalition. 
Government Response to the Proposal in South Africa 
A South African opposition party, Democratic Alliance, has proposed its own grant, 
where the tax threshold would be drawn downwards “so that those who earn more than 
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R7,500 would pay more in tax than the value grant itself and thus be discouraged from 
applying for the grant” (Makino 2003: 27). However, COSATU dismissed this proposal 
as there was no an income tax in place for those earning less than R30,000 per year 
(2003: 27). The DA proposal caused tensions between the party and the BIG Coalition, 
which  went  so  far  that  the  DA  leader  Tony  Leon  called  the  attack  against  the  DA  as  
“hysterical” (2003: 28). COSATU claimed that the party took up the proposal of BIG 
only to gain political support from the black majority in the elections of 2004 (2003: 
28). Interestingly, the way to respond to alternative opinions and criticism is similar to 
that of the Namibian BIG Coalition. 
The South African BIG Coalition kept the discussion concerning BIG alive, but the 
Treasury indicated its negative stand on the proposal. Furthermore, the Minister of 
Finance – Trevor Manuel, and Joel Netshitenzhe – Government spokesperson, have 
both, according to Kumiko Makino, spoken against the grant, arguing that people 
should be encouraged to work instead (Makino 2003: 21). Minister of Social 
Development, Zola Skweyiya, was more supportive for the idea, but questioned the 
capacity of the country to implement it (2003: 21). The linkages of COSATU to ANC 
assisted in keeping the BIG on agenda, but Brachiesi points out that “the outcomes of 
such discussions revealed a gradual foreclosure of spaces of political possibility for the 
basic  income grant,  despite  the  fact  that  the  proposal  was  at  the  center  of  a  resurgent  
civil society mobilization spurred by the “BIG coalition” started in 2001 with 
COSATU’s participation” (Frye and Kallmann, 2003, quoted in Barchiesi 2006: 18). 
From South Africa to Namibia: Old Wine in New Bottles? 
As discussed earlier in this thesis, the South African coalition has several characteristics 
that are similar to its Namibian counterpart. These include the name, member 
organizations, structure, and policy recommendations of the coalition23. However, the 
activities of the South African Coalition appear to have ceased, as for example the latest 
update on the coalition homepage has been made in March 2005 (South African BIG 
Coalition 2005). The similarities between the coalitions are not coincidental, as some of 
the members of the South African BIG Coalition continue to be active in the Namibian 
BIG  Coalition  (compare  for  example  South  African  BIG  Coalition  2003  B  and  
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Haarmann & Haarmann 2005). Dirk and Claudia Haarmann began their work at the 
DfSD in 2003 (Haarmann & Haarmann 2010). 
The idea of BIG has not been actively taken up by the largest party, ANC in South 
Africa, and the BIG Coalition has ceased to function. How has it been possible then, for 
such  an  active  coalition  to  start  function  in  Namibia?  Would  the  new coalition  not  be  
turned down by the idea as they saw the BIG Coalition in South Africa to cease to exist? 
Kumiko Makino understands that the South African BIG Coalition has influenced the 
debate in Namibia (Makino 2003: 28-29). It seems that the suggestion of BIG in 
Namibia was not only influenced by its counterpart in South Africa, but that the very 
same people have been working with the Namibian proposal. In the light of the 
similarities between the two proposals, it can even be said that the Namibian BIG 
Coalition has continued the work of the South African Coalition. 
5.3 Basics of the Namibian BIG Proposal 
A Basic Income Grant (BIG) is a monthly cash grant (e.g. 
N$10024) that would be paid by the state to every Namibian 
citizen regardless of age or income. The money, which is paid 
to people not in need, is recuperated through the tax system. - 
- Every Namibian would receive such a grant until s/he 
becomes eligible for a state pension at 60 years. In the case 
of children aged 17 or younger, the care-giver would receive 
the grant on behalf of the child. 
(Haarmann & Haarmann 2005: 13.) 
The quote above states the proposal of the Namibian BIG Coalition in a nutshell. The 
proposal to provide universal income to every citizen and to recuperate it through 
taxation are the most common features of basic income proposals. There are some 
elements that are not found from the proposals of a more general nature. These include 
the suggestion on the amount of the grant, restriction of the grant to citizens less than 60 
years of age, and providing the grant to the care-giver on behalf of a child.25 
According to the BIG Coalition, the reasons for introducing the BIG in Namibia, is to 
reduce poverty. Especially the reduction of the high level of inequality is of importance. 
The grant would be provided without a means-test, as the “classic welfare programmes 
using a means-test to target beneficiaries have been proven to be more expensive, 
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wasteful and also ineffective to target people and to limit social assistances to specific 
groups and people. If targeting is applied by means of added administrative 
requirements – the poorest are actually those who are least likely to get benefit from the 
programmes,  as  they  by  nature  are  the  most  disadvantaged  in  terms  of  access  to  
information, infrastructure, and administrative services provided” (Haarmann & 
Haarmann 2005: 14). Furthermore, Dirk and Claudia Haarmann argue that although the 
rich would receive the grant, they would pay more in taxation and therefore become net 
payers of the grant. In this way, certain group of people would not be labeled as poor, as 
“social assistance becomes a right”26. (2005: 14.) 
The coalition mentions certain disadvantages of the BIG, such as the “initial costs and 
the setting up of the delivery system”. After this, according to the coalition, the costs 
would go down, and the grant would most probably be stimulating economic growth. 
The coalition also responds to a question on how it is possible to “prevent people from 
wasting the grant on alcohol, lottery tickets, etc.?” The answer is simply: You cannot. 
However, it is reminded that “poor people cannot afford to waste their money and the 
majority of people use their money responsibly and wisely – the people themselves 
know what they need most”. (Haarmann & Haarmann 2005: 15-16.) This is perhaps the 
most central point of the argument for the BIG: the grant should be in cash, because the 
people know themselves, what is it that they most urgently need. 
Another argument against the BIG, according to the coalition, is dependency. However, 
the coalition reminds that “poor people are dependent on assistance from other people - 
-  A  BIG  gives  people  an  income  source  of  their  own,  which  they  can  count  on  and  
which enables them to take their own decisions.” (Haarmann & Haarmann 2005: 16.) 
As  people  would  no  longer  be  dependent  on  their  relatives  or  friends  on  income,  the  
grant would actually reduce dependency, and release resources for investments. 
Furthermore, BIG would be something people can trust on as a reliable source of 
income,  and  therefore  it  would  be  possible  for  them  to  plan  more  of  their  economic  
activities. (2005: 16.) 
According to the BIG Coalition, the basic income would contribute to three 
developmental aspects of the society. First, it would assist in meeting the basic needs 
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such as nutrition and housing. Secondly, it would contribute to the “capability” of the 
people, as they would be able to realize their full potential in several aspects of their 
lives27. Thirdly, it would provide people the “freedom of choice, security and power to 
take ownership. (Haarmann & Haarmann 2005: 39) The main thesis of the coalition is 
that the BIG would offer a solution to the poverty and inequality problem in Namibia. 
According to the BIG Resource Book, the basic income grant would immediately 
change the income distribution trend in Namibia. This is illustrated by two figures 
presented below. The change of income seems dramatic, and it indeed is, compared with 
the crude poverty line of U$1 per day. However, this is hardly surprising, as the people 
are assumed to receive the additional N$100 per month. Although the second figure 
states that “Inequality is reduced,” only the increased income for the poor is taken into 
consideration. In case the BIG would be funded through taxation on the groups with 
highest income, the curve might look different. However, this is only might, as the 
pictures do not show the amount of people receiving incomes exceeding N$10,034 per 
month. 
 
Picture 1: Current income distribution in Namibia (Haarmann & Haarmann 2005: 36) 
46 
 
 
Picture 2: “The impact of a BIG on Namibia’s income distribution compared to the 
current income distribution (dotted line) – Source: DfSD Microsimulation Model” 
(2005: 38) 
Michael Samson and Ingrid van Niekerk have written the fifth section of The Basic 
Income Grant in Namibia, Resource Book. Both of them have been involved with the 
basic income grant proposal in South Africa (Haarmann & Haarmann 2005: 48). The 
fifth part of the booklet discusses briefly the financial aspect of the basic income 
proposal in Namibia. According to Samson and van Niekerk (2005: 44), the population 
of Namibia in 1999 was estimated to be 1,7 million people, with the population growth 
rate of 1,5% per year. The estimated population size for 2004 is not mentioned in the 
paper, but a simple calculation assists: Assuming the growth rate of 1,5% per year, the 
estimated size of the population of Namibia in 2004 would be 1,751382.5, which means 
roughly 1,75 million. As the grant would not be provided to those eligible for the state 
pension, the percentage of the population receiving the grant would be 93.1 (1,630,537 
people). This means, according to Samson and van Niekerk (2005: 45) that the net cost 
would range from N$0.8 to N$1.4 billion per year depending on how the grant would be 
financed.28 
The basic idea behind the proposal has now been discussed. The following part will 
present the introduction of the BIG proposal in Namibia in more detail. It is important 
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to keep in mind the background of South African BIG proposal, as this part begins by 
introducing the “official truth;” the introduction of the basic income proposal by the 
Namtax Consortium. 
5.4 Critical Events in Introducing the BIG Proposal in Namibia 
This chapter takes a closer look to the events that led to the formation of the Namibian 
BIG Coalition. Newspaper articles, interviews, and background material, form the data 
of this chapter. According to the BIG Coalition, the basic income grant proposal was 
originally brought up in Namibia since 2002 as a government-based Namibian Tax 
Consortium proposed basic income among other suggestions in order to enhance the 
redistributive effects of the Namibian tax system (Namibian Tax Consortium 2002: 16). 
This suggestion was taken forward by the Desk for Social Development (DfSD) of the 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in the Republic of Namibia, proposing an increase in 
taxation in order to fund a monthly basic income of N$100 to every Namibian less than 
60 years of age (The Namibian 2004). 
This was followed by lobbying the Namibian government (Graig 2004, Isaacs 2006a 
and b) and launching the Basic Income Grant Coalition comprising of churches, NGOs 
and trade unions (Shigwedha 2005). The idea was discussed in the Namibian media 
every now and then (see for example Nyambe 2005, Lister 2005, Widlok 2005 and 
Gaomab 2006) until the BIG Coalition announced it is looking for an area to conduct a 
Pilot Project for basic income (Isaacs 2007a and b). According to Dirk Haarmann “It’s 
basically to get a concrete example of how the BIG can work, which we can show 
Government” (Isaacs 2007a). A small village called Omitara/Otjivero, some hundred 
kilometers east of the capital city Windhoek, was chosen for the BIG Pilot Project for 
the time period of 2008-2009 (Isaacs 2008a). 
Basic Income and the Namibian Tax Consortium 
The Namibian BIG Coalition refers to the Namibian Tax Consortium as the initial 
proponent of the basic income (Haarmann & Haarmann 2005: 19-29). This Consortium 
was requested to conduct a comprehensive review on tax legislation in 2001 (The 
Namibian Tax Consortium 2002: 8). The project was funded by the Swedish 
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International Development Authority (SIDA) and by the Government of Namibia 
(2002: 8). The consultants represented the University of Namibia and a private sector 
company Tax Consulting Services Namibia (Pty) Ltd, and included two Swedish 
experts (2002: 8). One member of this Consortium was Pieter le Roux, member of the 
Taylor Commission mentioned above. 
One of the seven specific terms of reference for the Consortium requested for 
“Addressing the issue of the redistribution of income” (The Namibian Tax Consortium 
2002: 9). The Consortium concluded with eighteen recommendations and 
implementation  dates  for  the  terms  of  reference  (2002:  6-7).  Three  of  these  were  not  
applicable at the specific moment, and fourteen were recommended to be conducted 
between the years of 2003 and 2006 (ibid.). However the income grant proposal was not 
given a specific due date, but the proposal was recommended to be conducted in 
“Medium Term” (ibid.). Against this background, it is quite interesting to see, how one 
of these eighteen recommendations of the Tax Review received such a strong response 
from the civil society organizations. 
Formation of the Namibian BIG Coalition 
Two  years  after  the  proposal  of  Namibian  Tax  Consortium,  the  Evangelical  Lutheran  
Church in the Republic of Namibia (ELCRN) drew together a seminar “Strengthening 
income  security  in  Namibia;  Poverty,  HIV/AIDS  and  the  need  for  a  basic  income  
grant”. Peter le Roux “from the University of the Western Cape” attended the seminar, 
as well as Bishop Zephaniah Kameeta. Both of them spoke positively about the basic 
income proposal, while the Institute for Public Policy and Research (IPPR) 
representative Robin Sherbourne was a bit more cautious. ELCRN had decided to 
“work with the Government to further investigate and implement the proposal”. 
(Tjaronda 2004a.) The Desk for Social Development of the ELCRN provided a 
background document for the seminar, outlining the principles of the proposal (Nampa 
2004). The participants of the seminar announced that they had formed “a 10- member 
committee which will drive the formation of a Coalition on BIG” (Tjaronda 2004b). 
Around the same time, New Era published a story stating that “Politicians [are] Split On 
BIG  Issue”  (Tjaronda  2004c).  While  Congress  of  Democrats  (Cod)  and  DTA  had  
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announced their support to the idea, the representatives of the Republican Party and 
Nudo were more cautious. Swapo Party was at that time commenting positively on the 
proposal, but still keeping a cautious voice: “- - under the current economic 
circumstances, the party could not commit itself to introducing the grant” New Era 
reported (2004a). 
Following the seminar organized in 2004, both New Era and the Namibian reported in 
April 2005 that the BIG Coalition had been formed (Shigwedha 2005 and Tjaronda 
2005). Bishop Kameeta from ELCRN, Peter Naholo from NUNW, and the 
representative of NANGOF commented on the proposal (Tjaronda 2005). This was 
followed by a debate in the newspapers, where for example the outspoken chief editor 
of the Namibian, Gwen Lister stated that basic income should not be paid to every 
citizen, but that it “should be targeted at those who don’t have access to a basic income 
in the first place” (Lister 2005). 
The first official publication of the BIG Coalition was brought into publicity in 
September 2005 in the meeting with the speaker of the National Assembly, Theo-Ben 
Gurirab, who “assured the coalition that Government was just as concerned about social 
welfare as civil society” (Isaacs 2005a). The publication was called The Basic Income 
Grant in Namibia, Resource Book (Haarmann & Haarmann 2005), and it was presented 
by Reverend Phillip Strydom, General Secretary of the CCN (Isaacs 2005a). New Era 
also reported on the meeting, referring to the “Church Group,” a delegation promoting 
BIG (Philander 2005). The coalition responded to this 17 October in a polite way, 
correcting that the delegation meeting Gurirab was not a “church group” but 
“represented the entire BIG Coalition, which is a broad-based coalition” (BIG Coalition 
2005). This response indicates that the coalition is quite sensitive concerning how it is 
described in public, although in this case the response was very polite. However this 
reaction might give a hint on what might be the response to other perceived flaws 
concerning the articles concerning basic income.  
Discussions with Government and Persisting on the Proposal 
The year 2006 was time for lobbying for the BIG in the Namibian government, as well 
as responding to the first critical perspective on the proposal. Both The Namibian and 
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New Era reported on the meeting with the President Hifikepunye Pohamba, where 
“Bishop Zephania Kameeta, BIG coordinator Reverend Philip (sic) Strydom, Legal 
Assistance Centre (LAC) Director Norman Tjombe and academic researcher Reverend 
Dirk Haarman (sic)” presented the idea (Isaacs 2006a). The result of this meeting, 
according to Kameeta, was that the President promised to take up the issue with the 
Cabinet, but did not commit himself to the realization of the proposal (Isaacs 2006a, 
Tjaronda 2006a). 
The Cabinet, however, made a clear rejection of the proposal in May 2005, when Prime 
Minister Nahas Angula made a statement on behalf of the Cabinet. The reason for this 
was that “introducing such a grant would make no economical sense” (Isaacs 2006b). 
Furthermore, “Angula said if the BIG was indeed believed to be a priority, Government 
would need to abolish its existing subsidies and grants to make money available” 
(2006b). However, Angula proposed to the representatives of the Coaliton, that they 
could raise part of the funds themselves, and government could then employ people to 
assist (2006b). This led Bishop Kameeta to state that the BIG Coalition did not regard 
the rejection as total, and that they would need to discuss the way forward within the 
coalition (2006b). The meeting was reported by the national TV-station, Namibian 
Broadcasting Corporation (NBC), which had not been the intention of the coalition. 
When  the  rejection  of  the  proposal  had  leaked  to  the  public,  Bishop  Kameeta  took  a  
clear stand on judging the news report concerning the meeting not aimed for the public 
(Isaacs, 2006c). According to him, the report did not correctly represent the ideas 
provided by the coalition (2006e). After these events, New Era reported that “Govt 
Vetoes BIG – For Now” (Sibeene 2006). 
In August 2006 the BIG Coalition made headlines such as “BIG is back,” “Coalition 
Persists on BIG,” and “BIG stands its ground” (Isaacs 2006d and e, Tjaronda 2006b). 
These were the result of a workshop organized by the BIG Coalition, called “Church 
and Society”. Dirk Haarmann, Zephania Kameeta, and Phillip Strydom were the 
spokespersons for the coalition in these articles. Towards the end of the year, the 
representatives of the BIG Coalition participated in the 11th Basic Income Earth 
Network Congress. Bishop Kameeta was one of the participants, stating, according to 
the Namibian, that the opponents of the proposal did not have the understanding of the 
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concept, “or they despise the poor” (Isaacs 2006f). Zola Skweyiya, Minister for Social 
Development  in  South  Africa,  came  out  shortly  thereafter  as  a  supporter  of  the  grant  
(ibid.). 
Towards  the  end  of  2006,  BIG  Coalition  awoke  to  the  criticism  of  the  International  
Monetary Fund (IMF). This discussion will be followed more closely in the later 
chapter of this thesis. However, this was the first situation where the coalition came out 
very aggressively defending the proposal of the basic income, and it is therefore one of 
the key elements in the development of the situation. 
Heyday of the BIG Proposal 
The year 2007 was very busy for the BIG Coalition. At the beginning of the year, the 
representatives of ELCRN and LaRRI presented their paper to the United Nations 
Commission for Social Development, former Prime Minister Hage Geingob stepped out 
as a supporter of the grant, and the coalition announced its plan to implement the grant 
scheme in one of the villages of Namibia. In 2007, 19 newspaper articles directly 
discussing the BIG proposal were published in the English-speaking newspapers of 
Namibia. Furthermore additional 14 articles mentioned the BIG in one way or another. 
As mentioned previously, the Basic Income Grant proposal was taken up by the 
representatives of the BIG Coalition in the presentation to the United Nations 
Commission for Social Development, 45th session, 7-16 February 2007. This “research 
paper” is written by “Bishop Dr. Z. Kameeta, Dr. Claudia Haarmann, Dr. Dirk 
Haarmann, and Herbert Jauch”29. It has been published in Windhoek, but the publisher 
name is not mentioned. The paper draws a conclusion in “Section 4: Towards a good 
practice model,” where the Basic Income Grant proposal is introduced in detail 
(Kameeta et al 2007). 
The  United  Nations  Department  of  Economic  and  Social  Affairs,  Division  For  Social  
Policy and Development homepage states following: “The forty-fifth session focused on 
employment, ageing, disability and youth. - - The Commission adopted, by 
consensus, key resolutions urging greater attention to the needs of youth and elderly 
persons as countries pursued national social policy and wider development goals” 
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(emphasis by author, United Nations 2007a). No reference is made to the basic income 
proposal. The fourty-nine page Final Report on the Forty-Fifth Session mentions basic 
income, once: Annex I of the report provides  a twenty-five point summary by the 
Chairperson on the discussions on the theme “Promoting full employment and decent 
work for all” (United Nations 2007b: 33-37). Point 24 mentions Brazil’s bolsa familia 
grant, and thereafter states following: “A recent proposal for a basic income grant for all 
has emerged as a good practice model for alleviating poverty and empowering the poor 
to improve their livelihoods. Under that proposal, a monthly cash grant would be issued 
to each citizen up to pensionable age” (2007b: 37). Thereafter, point 24 mentions “a 
national rural employment guarantee programme” (2007b: 37). This means the basic 
income proposal made it to one of the twenty-five discussion points, and in that point, 
sharing the discussion with two other proposals on social security. In this light, the 
Namibian  response,  seems  way  too  eager:  “UN  agency  impressed  with  Nam  BIG”  
announced the Namibian (Isaacs 2007b) and New Era stated that “UN Commends BIG 
Proposals” (Tjaronda 2007b). 
The BIG proposal was gaining support in Namibian forums. On 14 February the 
Namibian  reported  “BIG Coalition  goes  it  alone,”  and  described  the  presentation,  and  
the idea of the pilot project presented by Dirk Haarmann (Isaacs 2007a). New Era 
announced: “Coalition to Experiment with BIG” (Tjaronda 2007a). Former Prime 
Minister, Hage Geingob stepped out as a supporter of BIG in March (Weidlich 2007). 
He  stated  in  front  of  Parliament,  that  poverty  was  a  serious  problem in  Namibia,  and  
that the introduction of BIG should be considered (2007). Hage Geingob also became 
the first one taking up the challenge to contribute to the BIG experiment, in August 
2007 (Isaacs 2007d). 
August 2007 was also the first time for the official announcement of the BIG Pilot 
Project ground, and thereafter the actual project was prepared for. The Namibian and 
New Era announced: “BIG to go big on BIG!” (Isaacs 2007c), “BIG Pilot Project On its 
Wheels” (Philander 2007), “BIG Launched” (Tjaronda 2007c), “Omitara goes BIG” 
(Isaacs 2007d), “BIG Takes Off” (New Era 2007), “Eewa – The BIG Lifeline” 
(Tjaronda 2007d), Women Left with No Income (Tjaronda 2007e)30 and “Residents 
who Pin their Hopes on Big” (Tjaronda 2007f) – all this only in August 2007. One 
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critical opinion was also published at that time in the Namibian, titled “Opposed To 
‘Free Money’” (Hangula 2007). The German-speaking newspaper published a pledge 
written by Claudia and Dirk Haarmann requesting for donations for the project 
(Haarmann & Haarmann 2007), while the English-speaking ones published more 
detailed articles on the set-up of the project. 
The BIG Pilot Project was certainly the culmination point in the work of the BIG 
Coalition. It received international interest – at least to certain extent – and was closely 
followed in the English- and German-speaking newspapers31. The following part of this 
chapter will present the set-up of the pilot project, and thereafter the major events 
during  the  two-year  project  with  regard  to  the  work  of  the  BIG  Coalition  will  be  
discussed.  
BIG Pilot Project 
 
Picture 3: Otjivero village in May 2008 
Omitara/Otjivero settlement is located just by the border of Omaheke and Khomas 
regions (NPC 2006: 11). As the formal village of Omitara is in the Omaheke region in 
the area of Steinhausen, the informal settlement area of Otjivero is also connected to 
this region. Omaheke region is located in the eastern part of Namibia, bordering the 
Republic of Botswana in the east. According to the Regional Poverty Profile, the thick 
layers of Kalahari sediments make the mining efforts practically impossible, and 
therefore there are no major mining activities in the area. The nearby Otjivero dam is 
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one of the three supplies of water to the only municipality of the area, Gobabis. The life 
expectancy at birth for females is 66 years, and for males 64. Roughly quarter of the 
population live in urban settlements, concentrated in Gobabis. Roughly 77 per cent of 
the population speaks one of the three major languages in the area: Otjiherero, 
Nama/Damara or Afrikaans, leaving the largest language group of Namibia, 
Oshiwambo-speakers, sixth. The region of Omaheke consists of 68 039 inhabitants, the 
area of Steinhausen accommodating 9600 inhabitants. This would mean that roughly 
one tenth of the population in Steinhausen area lives in the village of Omitara. (NPC 
2006: 21-24) 
The overall look of the village is a bit dirty, and poor. There are some brick houses, but 
the majority of houses are made of corrugated iron sheets and plastic covers. One could 
see an increase in brick houses between 2008 and 2009. However, the overall image of 
the village did not change much during one year. According to my queries, people live 
out of small livestock and by selling homemade products such as home-brewed beer, 
fatcakes, and roasted meat. A number of people also get pensions, and in this way assist 
the whole family. Although the village is said to be poor, some basic services are 
available for the citizens. These include primary school, clinic, police station, shop, and 
a post office. Clean water is also available in public taps located around the village, as 
the nearby Otjivero dam provides water. (Omitara 31.5.2008) 
The Basic Income Grant Coalition launched Basic Income Grant Pilot Project in 
Otjivero/Omitara in January 2008 (Basic Income Grant Coalition 2008: 9). As 
mentioned before, the official aim of the project was to show that it indeed is possible to 
provide BIG for the citizens. The N$100 grant was provided to 930 residents, all of 
them below the age of 60 years. The grant was provided to the care-giver of the children 
below the age of 21. The official intention of the coalition was to “monitor and evaluate 
the effects of BIG on individuals living in the area and on the community overall”. This 
was to be conducted openly, and “the evidence would be made available to the 
Namibian Government, all Namibians and the international audience, so that objective 
analysis could be conducted and policy decisions taken on the basis of real empirical 
data. This was the commitment made by the BIG Coalition”. (Basic Income Grant 
Coalition 2008a: 15-17.) Appendix 3 presents the “proof of registration” – form 
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provided to the inhabitants of the village as they registered to the BIG Coalition. In July 
2008, a smart-card system for the payment of the grant was introduced (Omitara 
20.6.2009). 
 
Picture 4: Smart Card for the payment of BIG 
People living in the village viewed the BIG very positively. Some suggested the grant 
should be larger, and some openly admitted that there are people who have misuses the 
money. The grant has however assisted people in receiving their daily meals, and school 
attendance had increased. The interviewees could rarely specify how they thought the 
funds should be collected for the BIG. In 2008 people were very open and ready to 
discuss the grant. (Omitara 31.5, 9.-13.6.2008) This had changed, as I went to visit the 
village again in 2009. Some people were still very open and willing to share their 
thoughts on the matter, but others refused to discuss the BIG on the grounds that we 
were not authorized by the coalition to discuss the influence of BIG. A lady in her 
twenties mentioned even that we should have not been allowed to walk around the 
village by ourselves. She mentioned that people coming to the village should always be 
accompanied by somebody from the village Committee (such as herself), so that they 
could make sure people would not be saying wrong things concerning the grant. 
(Omitara 20.6.2009.) 
Project Begins – an Instant Success? 
In November 2007 the BIG Coalition announced it was prepared to begin the BIG 
project in January. New Era reported: “BIG Welcome Relief for Otjivero Community” 
(sic) (Tjaronda 2007a) and the Namibian “Omitara goes BIG” (Isaacs 2008a). After the 
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first payout day New Era reported “BIG Payout Exercise a Success” (Tjaronda 2008b) 
and “BIG Coalition Disburses Grants” (Tjaronda 2008a). However, this was not the 
opinion of all. According to the shop owner, during the first and second payout day 
crimes were reported, even a killing in one of the shebeens32 of the village (Omitara 
13.6.2008b). The shop owner of the village came out in criticizing the behavior of the 
people, and the grant, and Bishop Kameeta in turn decided this opinion was only related 
to his business interest (Isaacs 2008c). This viewpoint was affirmed by Dirk Haarmann, 
when I met him in the payout day of May 2008 in Omitara (Omitara 16.6.2008). 
The first results of the project were published in September 2008 and a study was 
officially  conducted  by  DfSD  and  LaRRI.  “BIG  a  big  success  at  Omitara,”  the  
Namibian announced (Isaacs 2008d) whereas New Era was more moderate: “BIG 
Coalition Assesses Impact of N$100 Grant” (Tjaronda 2008c). This report, named 
“Towards  a  Basic  Income Grant  for  all!”  introduces  the  beginning  of  the  project,  and  
the background of the proposal. Stories of selected people from Omitara are presented. 
The methodology and the findings are also shortly presented. 
In the report, Section 1.4, Methodology states the following: “The BIG Coalition 
committed itself to carefully evaluating the pilot project in order to assess the impact of 
the BIG and to be able to guide national policy-makers” (BIG Coalition 2008a : 20). 
The coalition mentions that the survey of other areas should have been ideal for the 
research, but “this is not only statistically very difficult, given the particular features of 
Otjivero-Omitara but also ethically problematic” (2008a: 20). This is not elaborated 
further, so one is left to wonder how the results of the study should be interpreted if the 
village has “particular features” and cannot therefore be compared with other Namibian 
villages. The coalition has, according to the booklet, used four types of research 
methods on collecting the data from the village: a baseline study was conducted in 
November 2007, a panel survey had been conducted in July 2008, information from key 
informants was gathered, and a set of case studies were used (2008a: 21). The results 
included the dropping of child malnutrition rate, rising employment, increase in 
household  income  –  in  addition  to  the  BIG  –  increase  in  the  payment  of  school  fees,  
increase in the payment of clinic fees, empowering young women and decreasing the 
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rate of transactional sex, reducing economic and poverty related crime rates, and 
helping to progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. (2008a: 10-11). 
The  report  does  not  provide  more  detailed  information  on  any  of  the  outcomes  of  the  
project, and they were not available elsewhere either. This raises certain questions, as it 
would be interesting to know for example, how the rate of transactional sex is 
measured. The publication of this report was followed by the criticism from Namibian 
Economic  Policy  Research  UNIT  (NEPRU)  towards  the  results  of  the  research.  This  
caused a panic-like response from the coalition, and will be discussed later in more 
detail. The continuation of the pilot project, publication of the first report, and the public 
discussion  after  that  were  the  key  events  in  the  progress  of  the  work  of  the  BIG  
Coalition in 2008. 
Towards the End 
The election year 2009 should have been the year when the government of Namibia 
takes the final decision to introduce the BIG in the country. This was not the case, but 
the coalition made efforts to convince the government about the feasibility of the grant. 
The coalition wrote a letter to the Namibian 7 August 2009 with the heading “A BIG 
Grant  for  Little  People”  (BIG  Coalition  2009).  Bishop  Kameeta  also  appealed  to  the  
government, claiming that “Poverty in Namibia is a scandal” (Shejavali 2009a). The 
coalition also organized at least one lobbying workshop, mentioned above, for the 
representatives of the civil society. 
The elections of 2009 went as expected, and the government did not commit itself to the 
introduction of BIG. During the last months of the BIG pilot project, the coalition 
decided to continue the payment of the grant at Omitara in 2009. This payment was 
called a “bridging allowance” (Shejavali 2009b). This was to be provided to the people 
in  the  village,  as  the  BIG  Coalition  officially  expected  the  government  to  still  
implement the grant scheme during the following years (2009b). At the end of 2009, the 
coalition circulated pictures drawn by the schoolchildren of Otjivero, presenting the 
impact of the BIG to the lives of their families. In August 2010, the final report of the 
pilot project remained yet to be published, although the homepage of the coalition had 
changed the name of the 2009 report to Final Report. 
58 
 
5.5 Conclusion: Transformation of the Coalition 
In this chapter I have argued, that the Namibian BIG Coalition has continued the work 
of its South African counterpart. However, the Desk for Social Development of ELCRN 
claim the proposal has been brought up by Namibian Tax Consortium, which indeed 
recommended BIG – in one of its eighteen recommendations. The BIG Coalition was 
taken up by DfSD, and the proposal was discussed in the Namibian media. However, 
the government did not support the proposal, and the BIG Coalition sought for support 
elsewhere. After presenting the idea of BIG in a UN meeting, it announced the launch 
of BIG pilot project, which was conducted in Omitara during the years 2008 and 2009. 
The basic income grant proposal has been the very same throughout the years, but the 
role  of  the  BIG  Coalition  in  Namibia  has  changed.  First  it  was  a  network  of  
organizations, which supported the idea of basic income. Gradually the idea of piloting 
the proposal in one of the Namibian villages was presented, and finally the BIG 
Coalition launched the project, and in this way became an organization for development 
cooperation, which simultaneously claims to do research concerning the project. The 
aim was not, however, to bring development to Omitara as such, but to show that the 
basic income would have such a positive outcome, that the government would be 
pressed to implement it on a national level.  
The Namibian public, including the press, has been positive towards the BIG proposal 
as well as towards the pilot project experiment. The people living in Omitara have also 
perceived the grant as a valuable and positive thing. Unfortunately, the results of this 
pilot project are very difficult to analyze, as the booklets published by the BIG Coalition 
do not provide detailed information on the research, but rely on the stories of the 
individual citizens of the village. At the end of the pilot project, the proposal had not 
gained wide support among the politicians of the country. Instead, one of the counter-
arguments for the BIG Proposal has indeed been pronounced by the Prime minister, 
Nahas  Angula.  This  will  be  discussed  in  the  next  chapter  as  the  clashes  with  the  
environment are analyzed in detail. 
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6. Coalition and Clashes with the Environment 
6.1 Legitimacy of the Basic Income Grant Coalition 
This chapter takes a look at the legitimate actors in the BIG Coalition. The chapter is 
divided into two interlinked parts. The first one analyzes the relations within the 
coalition by looking for those who announce the opinions in public. The second part 
looks at the clashes between the BIG Coalition and its environment. The theory of 
resource dependence will be used as the social legitimacy of the coalition is discussed in 
relation to its environment. Social legitimacy as a resource is the most important 
concept  in  this  chapter,  as  the  first  part  looks  into  who  are  those  who  search  for  this  
legitimacy, and the second part analyzes the responses to the questioning of the social 
legitimacy. The newspaper articles collected for this research provide a valuable 
perspective to the analysis. The articles collected mostly from newspapers The 
Namibian and New Era for the time period between 2004 and 2009 will be analyzed. 
The interviews and publications of the BIG Coalition, as well as observations will also 
assist in the analysis. 
Social Legitimacy as a Resource 
The theory of resouce dependence and the concept of social legitimacy have been 
presented above. The idea in this part of the thesis is to use the concept of social 
legitimacy in the concept of resource dependence theory initially described by Pfeffer 
and Salancik (1978). Lewis (2007) connects their thoughts to NGO research, as they 
emphasize the influence of the environment in the work of different types of 
organizations. As mentioned in the introductory chapters, Hatch and Cunliffe (2006) 
present the term social legitimacy, an addition of the institutional perspective to 
resource dependence theory. So, the term social legitimacy will be borrowed from the 
symbolic-interpretive background of institutionalism, and combined with the theory of 
resource dependence. An important element in the analysis is the identification of these 
resources, and tracing them (Hatch and Cunliffe 2006: 80-83).  This study argues that 
the search for social legitimacy (as a resource) influences the internal work of the BIG 
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Coalition. Therefore it is important to find out how this legitimacy is searched for, and 
who is searching for it. 
The concept of legitimacy has two connotations in this context. The first one is social 
legitimacy as a resource. The relationship of the coalition with the surrounding 
environment defines the social legitimacy of the coalition in the context of the general 
environment. This environment has essentially three dimensions: one is the Namibian 
society, the second one is the pilot project village, and the third one is the international 
environment.  The second connotation reflects the positions of the central  personalities 
of the coalition – of those who have gained the legitimacy inside the organization and 
are therefore the ones to seek for social legitimacy from the environment. 
To  my  understanding,  social  legitimacy  in  the  context  of  the  BIG  Coalition  refers  to  
something the coalition cannot function without, and something it needs to gain in 
different ways. Social legitimacy in Namibia means that the work of the organization is 
understood as legitimate, and therefore the claims made by it are also legitimate. Social 
legitimacy is a resource that might be gained from one part of the environment, but it is 
far more challenging to gain it from the whole interorganizational network. The second 
part of this chapter looks into those situations where the legitimacy is questioned, while 
the first part looks into the inner dynamics of the coalition, and searches for those who 
are allowed to seek social legitimacy for the coalition. 
Between 2004 and 2009 The Namibian and New Era newspapers published 99 articles 
discussing the BIG proposal in Namibia. None of them questioned the legitimacy of the 
BIG  Coalition,  although  some  critical  perspectives  were  published  as  well.  As  the  
coalition has strong social legitimacy in the Namibian press, it is interesting to see, how 
it responds to criticism. The four cases discussing the critique towards the work of the 
BIG Coalition are interesting in a way that the coalition has responded to them in 
related, but different ways. It will be argued that the coalition is very sensitive 
concerning any criticism aimed at the proposal and that this is due to the perceived 
threat to the social legitimacy of the coalition in Namibia, and perhaps even on an 
international level. The newspaper articles are used here as the main source of 
information; interviews, coalition publications and other material support this data. 
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In Search for the Legitimate Spokespeople 
This section concentrates on the representatives of the BIG Coalition. The title asks: 
Who formulates the opinions? I suggest that the spokespersons of the coalition do have 
more power in the opinion-building than those who do not speak about the pilot project 
in public. This provides a perspective to the internal hierarchy of the organization, 
where not every member the coalition is considered as a legitimate spokesperson. 
Spokespersons in the Newspapers 
According to the newspaper articles published in Namibian newspapers between 2004 
and May 2010 concerning the Basic Income Grant proposal and the coalition, mostly 
three people have spoken on behalf of the BIG Coalition. ELCRN Bishop Zephaniah 
Kameeta is the most visible spokesperson of the coalition, and he also chairs it 
(Tjaronda 2009b and !Hoases 2009a) as well as is the President of the CCN in 2009 
(!Hoases 2009a). He spoke in the newspapers on behalf of the coalition 28 times during 
the time period under scrutiny. Reverend of the ELCRN, and the representative of the 
DfSD,  Dirk  Haarmann,  spoke  on  behalf  of  the  BIG  Coalition  in  the  Namibian  
newspapers 16 times during 2004-2010. The third most-outspoken person comes from 
the Labour Resource and Research Institute, LaRRI. He is Herbert Jauch, who spoke on 
behalf  of  the  coalition  13  times  during  the  time  period.  Reverend  Claudia  Haarmann,  
also from the ELCRN and DfSD, and CCN Reverend Phillip Strydom have spoken 
eight and six times respectively. Other coalition members have not been this active: 
NANASO, NUNW and LAC have clearly been the most silent organizations in the BIG 
Coalition, only promoting the BIG in the newspapers once or twice at most. Uhuru 
Dempers from Nangof Trust have been a bit more active with the most recent 
organization joining the coalition, National Youth Council, but their contributions in the 
newspapers are less than five each. 
From the perspective above, one could draw a conclusion that the church organizations 
do have a vital role in the coalition. However, this is not the message the spokespeople 
wish to convey. This became clear from the above mentioned response to the article of 
Philander, when he referred to “Church Group” instead of BIG Coalition. It is, of course 
possible, that the public spokespersons have been decided upon by making a democratic 
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choice, and the others, not so eager to stand out in public, would be happy to work in 
the other fields of the BIG Coalition. However, this study proposes that the same people 
who are working actively with the public also work in the pilot project, not leaving 
much space for those who are not active in the public. 
People Behind the Publications 
The Basic Income Grant Coalition has provided one larger booklet concerning the basic 
income proposal; smaller “Information Brochure” in English, Afrikaans, Nama-Damara, 
Oshiwambo, Otjiherero and Silozi; and “Research Reports” from Omitara/Otjivero 
study. A “Research Paper” concerning employment named “Promoting employment and 
decent work for all – Towards a good practice model in Namibia” was a Presentation to 
the United Nations Commission for Social Development 7-16 February 2007, by 
Bishop Kameeta (Kameeta et al 2007). The booklet draws a conclusion proposing the 
basic income: “The BIG, while being administratively simple and just, would not only 
reduce poverty, but also avail resources necessary for the poor to successfully enter into 
employment or self-employment” (2007: 25). The authors of this paper include 
Zephaniah Kameeta, Claudia Haarmann, Dirk Haarmann, and Herbert Jauch. The 
publisher of the booklet is not mentioned. 
The Basic Income Grant in Namibia – Resource Book, provides the basic background 
information concerning the basic income proposal in the country (Haarmann & 
Haarmann 2005).  It  is  edited  by  Claudia  and  Dirk  Haarmann.  The  first  section  of  the  
booklet includes speeches held in the launch of the Basic Income Grant Coalition 27 
April 2005 by Zephaniah Kameeta representing ELCRN and CCN, Peter Naholo 
representing NUNW, and Sandi Tjaronda representing NANGOF. The author of the 
section two is not mentioned. The authors of the section three: “How it all started – 
Government’s Namtax commission” are not mentioned either. However, this is 
presumably the appendix to the initial document provided by the Namtax consortium as 
it states following: “This appendix contains the Consortium’s tax proposal to address 
the serious problem of poverty and income inequality in Namibia” (Haarmann & 
Haarmann 2005: 19). Section four is written by Claudia and Dirk Haarmann. It also 
provides some background on the authors: “They are pastors of the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church in the Republic of Namibia (ELCRN) and are currently working as the 
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Project Directors of the Desk for Social Development (DfSD-ELCRN). Both hold a 
PhD  in  Social  Development  from  the  Institute  for  Social  Development  (UWC,  South  
Africa) and a Masters in Theology (Germany).” (Haarmann & Haarmann 2005: 42.) 
Finally, the fifth section is written by “Prof. Dr. Michael Samson and Ms. Ingrid van 
Niekerk. Dr. Samson is the Director of the Economic Policy Research Institute in South 
Africa (EPRI) - - Ms van Niekerk is a Co-Director of EPRI. Both have done extensive 
work on the Basic Income Grant in South Africa et al. for the Cabinet appointed Taylor 
Commission.” (Haarmann & Haarmann 2005: 48.) 
Interestingly, it is not mentioned that like Michael Samson and Ingrid van Niekerk, both 
Claudia and Dirk Haarmann have also done “extensive work on the Basic Income Grant 
in  South  Africa”.  For  example,  the  Basic  Income  Coalition  of  South  Africa  (2003)  
provides a Background Briefing on the Basic Income Grant, where additional 
information concerning the economical aspect of the basic income can be attained from 
Dr. Claudia Haarmann, Dr. Dirk Haarmann, and Prof. Michael Samson (2003: 5). Both 
have also participated on the work of so-called Taylor Committee, or Committee of 
Inquiry for Comprehensive Social Security, as the researchers of both EPRI and 
Institute for Social Development, UWC (EPRI 2001). 
“Towards a Basic Income Grant for all!” is the first report of the Basic Income Grant 
pilot project presented to the public. It was published in September 2008, and the first 
page reveals the authors of the report: Claudia Haarmann, Dirk Haarmann, Herbert 
Jauch, Hilma Shindondola-Mote (director of LaRRI), Nicoli Nattrass (Director of the 
AIDS and Society Research Unit and Professor in the School of Economics, University 
of Cape Town, South Africa), Michael Samson (Economic Policy Research Unit EPRI, 
South Africa; Professor at Williams College, USA) and Guy Standing (Professor of 
Economic Security, University of Bath, UK; Professor of Labour Economics, Monash 
University, Australia) (Basic Income Grant Coalition 2008a: VII). The three last names 
refer to the “International Advisory Group,” which includes one more academic, Dr. 
Godfrey Kanyenze who is the Director of the Labour and Economic Development 
Research Institute of Zimbabwe (LEDRIZ) (2008a: VII). The second booklet Making 
the difference! The BIG in Namibia is  written  by  Claudia  Haarmann,  Dirk  Haarmann,  
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Herbert Jauch, Hilma Shindondola-Mote, Nicoli Nattrass, Ingrid van Niekerk and 
Michael Samson (Basic Income Grant Coalition 2009). 
Spokespersons of the Interviews 
The newspaper articles and the publications of the coalition have provided some 
suggestions on who are the most active people in the BIG Coalition. The interviews do 
support at least certain parts of this viewpoint. LAC did not answer to the request for 
organizing an interview, not indicating an active interest in discussing the subject. 
NUNW representative specifically mentioned that they share the viewpoint of LaRRI to 
the  BIG  proposal,  and  therefore  will  not  have  anything  to  add.  The  representative  of  
NANASO mentioned that they are having a large network of organizations, and in that 
way they are able to share information efficiently, stating a slightly different role for the 
organization in the coalition than that of for example that of conducting research 
(NANASO 2008b). The representative also mentioned that they are part of the Board of 
the  BIG  Coalition,  and  a  representative  of  the  organization  had  also  visited  
Omitara/Otjivero village at the launch of the BIG (NANASO 2008b). The 
representative of CCN was closely affiliated with the Evangelical Lutheran Church in 
Namibia (ELCIN) which has not been a loud supporter of the BIG in the media (CCN 
2008).  The  role  of  the  church  in  the  coalition,  according  to  the  interviewee,  was  to  
advocate for the BIG in the congregations and to collect funds (2008). The people 
should, according to the representative, be educated on how to use the money in order to 
use it properly, which contradicts the official opinion of the BIG Coalition (2008). The 
representative also mentioned that ELCRN and Bishop Kameeta have had an active role 
in  the  BIG  Coalition  (2008).  The  representative  of  the  Desk  for  Social  Development,  
and the representative of LaRRI, both explained the BIG initiative very thoroughly, not 
referring to other projects of the organization (unlike the representative of the CCN, for 
example), and therefore these representatives seem to be those who have been actively 
participating in the progress of the proposal (LaRRI 2008 and DfSD 2008). 
In conclusion, it seems that the most active members of the BIG Coalition come from 
ELCRN, its DfSD, and LaRRI. The newspaper articles, interviews, and a simple 
analysis of the publications of the coalition support this view. It is impossible to say for 
granted that the opinions of the active members weigh more, but it is very likely for two 
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reasons: First, activities of some of the spokespeople can be traced back to the initial 
proposal in South Africa, and secondly the same people from the same organizations do 
present their opinions in different forums: in newspapers, in the coalition publications, 
and in the interviews. This view is further emphasized as the criticism towards the 
proposal is discussed. For some reason, the activists from South Africa either are not 
publicly active figures in the coalition (such as Michael Samson), or they do not 
emphasize their background in South Africa (such as Dirk and Claudia Haarmann).  
It is very likely that the spokespeople of the BIG Coalition are those who also form the 
official opinion. This is because these people have been involved in the South African 
BIG  Coalition,  and  they  have  also  contributed  to  most  of  the  publications  of  the  
Namibian coalition. These spokespeople also search for social legitimacy for the 
coalition. This is done in several ways: by providing the publications to the environment 
as  well  as  making  statements  to  the  press.  However,  the  access  to  all  levels  of  the  
interorganizational environment is not granted easily. Politicians and social scientists, 
for  example,  do  not  completely  share  the  positive  attitude  towards  the  BIG  proposal.  
This can be seen from the criticism aimed at the proposal. In these cases the legitimacy 
of the arguments by “foreign” critics or those who “are not friends of the poor” is 
questioned by the spokespeople mentioned above. 
6.2 Social Legitimacy Questioned: BIG Coalition and Clashes with the 
Environment 
 “Opponent of the Poor” – IMF Opposes BIG 
The first example perceived as a threat by the BIG Coalition concerns the statement of 
the International Monetary Fund to the basic income proposal in Namibia. A staff team 
of the IMF produced the document for background documentation, and it was 
completed 9 March 2006. The 111-page paper discusses unemployment, education, 
poverty and social policy, changing demographics and the sustainability of the universal 
pension grant, and prospects concerning a monetary union for Namibia (IMF 2006). 
One  of  the  three  main  findings  of  the  part  Dimensions of Poverty and Social Policy 
Towards the Poor is: 
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The recent proposal to introduce a Basic Income Grant 
(BIG)—providing a monthly cash grant to all Namibians 
below 60 years old—would be very costly and may 
jeopardize macroeconomic stability. The current estimate 
suggests that the cost of such a grant would be close to 5 
percent of GDP. While it would reduce poverty, the likely 
effect on income distribution is debatable. (IMF 2006: 17) 
After shortly presenting the basic income proposal, two main conclusions are drawn: 
Although it is critical to address poverty and inequality in 
Namibia, the current BIG proposal may put economic 
stability at risk and could compromise the country’s overall 
prudent fiscal policy stance. - - The affordability of the 
proposal, possible tax evasion, and effects on macroeconomic 
stability—one of Namibia’s greatest assets—should be 
carefully analyzed. 
-- 
A universal cash grant may have unintended fertility and 
labor market effects that must be taken into account. If all 
citizens, including children, are entitled to a monthly cash 
grant, this may distort incentives to have children and 
increase fertility, which may conflict with other health 
policies underway. (IMF 2006: 27.) 
The calculations and the approach of the IMF were strongly criticized by the BIG 
Coalition. The Namibian discussed this 21 November 2006 with the headline: “BIG 
Coalition  takes  aim  at  the  IMF”  (Isaacs  2006f).  The  coalition  claimed  that  the  
calculations of the Fund were incorrect, and head of the IMF Delegation, J. Muller 
agreed  on  that.  Rather  than  answering  to  the  other  claims  of  the  IMF,  both  Dirk  
Haarmann and Herbert Jauch attacked strongly against the organization. The Namibian 
reported Haarmann saying that IMF opposed the proposal “on ideological grounds, 
rather than due to economic or social considerations” (Isaacs 2006g). Jauch, in turn 
“called the organization an opponent of the poor that influenced governments without 
taking responsibility or learning from its failures. - - The only rationale behind the 
IMF’s advice was to limit effective redistribution in Namibia” (2006f). Wezi Tjaronda 
of New Era reported on the same occurrence: “The BIG Coalition said the IMF should 
not  be  allowed  to  have  a  say  on  Namibia’s  much  needed  social  policies  which  once  
implemented would lead to greater equality and alleviate the misery of the poor, and 
which would be a first step towards redistributive justice.” (Tjaronda 2006c.) 
Interestingly, the calculations by another foreign organization, Economic Policy 
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Research Institute (EPRI) of South Africa, were considered as a reliable source of 
information. Thereafter, Dirk Haarmann adds: “We hope and trust that the government 
is independent and that the IMF cannot dictate” (2006c). 
The IMF responded to the criticism shortly. The Namibian reported 22 November 2006: 
“IMF responds to BIG criticism, suggests Latin American way” (Isaacs 2006g). In this 
article “Johannes Mueller, Chief of the IMF’s recent ‘Article IV Mission’ to Namibia” 
clarified that the previous calculation (of BIG costing 5,5% of the national GDP) was 
the gross cost of the measure, and the BIG Coalition was correct in stating that the net 
cost could be lower if part of the grant would be recovered by amendments in taxation. 
However, Mueller maintained that the cost would still be high, and the IMF had 
proposed conditional cash-transfer programmes such as Bolsa Familia (Family Fund), 
that had proved positive results in Brazil (2006g). Finally, according to the Namibian, 
Mueller had said “however the Namibian Government decided to tackle poverty 
remained a public policy choice, and the IMF was only acting in an advisory capacity” 
(2006g). 
Three things can be concluded from this debate. First, the representatives of the BIG 
Coalition are extremely worried that the government of Namibia will be influenced in a 
wrong way. This can be interpreted as a sign of insecurity concerning the legitimacy of 
the BIG Coalition in the eyes of the government. Social legitimacy may be high among 
the NGOs and even the Namibia public, but the government may not have the same 
perspective. The coalition is therefore not fully legitimate in its general environment. 
Secondly, a member of the international environment, IMF, does not seem to view the 
basic  income  proposal  as  fully  legitimate,  or  at  least  not  as  the  only  truth.  This  
international organization does not, however, question the legitimacy of the BIG 
Coalition.  Thirdly,  the  coalition  does  not  seem  to  be  willing  to  engage  in  the  debate  
concerning the questions posed by the critiques, but decides to attack the organization 
instead of answering to the argument. This can be interpreted in two ways: either the 
coalition does not want to discuss the possible challenges of the basic income proposal, 
or it understands the criticism of the IMF as an attack towards the legitimacy of the BIG 
Coalition. In this case, the representative of the IMF respectfully elaborated on its stand, 
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and did not comment on the allegations of the coalition. The second example provides a 
more heated debate. 
Economist “Insulting the Poor” 
Quarterly Economic Review of NEPRU 
The results for the first half year after the introduction of the Basic Income Grant in 
Omitara/Otjivero village were published in September 2008. The booklet “Towards a 
Basic Income Grant for all!” concludes that the experiment has contributed to the 
attaining of all the eight Millennium Development Goals set by UN (Basic Income 
Grant Coalition 2008a: 96-97). The Quarterly Economic Review of Namibian 
Economic  Policy  Research  Unit  NEPRU  provided  “a  critical  analysis  of  the  first  
results”. One and a half-page text with a half-page table raised some questions for 
further discussion. The paper states that according to the food expenditure analysis, the 
average household in Otjivero is not poor33. It also said that “under closer scrutiny some 
of the effects do not seem to be very dramatic up to now” and that a “thorough analysis 
is however needed whether this is the best and cheapest option to reduce poverty, and 
improve health and education” (NEPRU 2008). In the article of New Era 24 October 
2008, Rigmar Osterkamp representing NEPRU is quoted saying: “The question is: is 
giving money to people more effective than [introducing radical] empowerment 
interventions, and public policies on health and education?” (Heita 2008). 
BIG Coalition Answer: NEPRU Should Apologize 
The answer to the review was furious. New Era reported on 04 November 2008: “BIG 
Secretariat Wants Nepru to Apologize” (Tjaronda 2008e). It continues as follows: “The 
BIG Secretariat yesterday said NEPRU comments are an insult to the poor in Otjivero 
and demanded that the country’s research organization apologise not only to the 
Otjivero community but also to all Namibians” (2008b). Claudia Haarmann stated that 
“the coalition wanted a critical analysis of the BIG assessment and nothing else and did 
not welcome Nepru’s comments” (2008b). NEPRU’s acting director Klaus Schade “said 
the research organization’s report was to stimulate debate for it to go beyond reports in 
the media” (2008b). 
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It might be difficult to understand, what is it that the BIG Coalition wanted NEPRU to 
apologize for. The press statement dated 3 November 2008 elaborates this part further. 
However, the statement by Claudia Haarmann is inconsistent, as she does not welcome 
the  comments  by  NEPRU,  but  calls  for  honest  and  open  debate,  as  well  as  “critical  
debate” on the subject. This is emphasized in the press statement. BIG Coalition is 
careful to use strong words when introducing the results of the first report studying the 
impact, and commenting on the criticism: “BIG dramatically reduced poverty,” “this 
strong evidence,” “the Coalition was thus deeply disappointed and dismayed to read the 
misleading and incorrect assessment of the report,” “claims of NEPRU are based on ill-
informed speculation and incorrect extrapolations,” and finally: “NEPRU’s approach is 
misleading and destroys a transparent and open debate.” The Coalition also reminds that 
“The actual research on the BIG Pilot is being carried out jointly by the Desk for Social 
Development (ELCRN) and the Labour Resource and Research Institute (LaRRI)” and 
that the “BIG research report stood up to the most rigorous academic and scientific 
standards” (Emphasis added, Basic Income Grant Coalition, 2008b). The BIG Coalition 
states that “NEPRU implies in its ‘Quarterly Economic Review’ that it conducted a 
‘research study’ whose findings allegedly contradict the BIG Pilot Project Assessment 
report” (2008b). Reference to this is not made, and this statement is incorrect as the 
topic of the paper is: “Basic Income Grant – a critical analysis of the first results” 
(NEPRU 2008). 
At this point, the coalition addresses the methodological errors it finds from NEPRU’s 
paper claiming that NEPRU has manipulated the data for wrong purposes, used wrong 
calculation methods, or ignored important pieces of data. Therefore, the coalition draws 
concluding remarks: 
We welcome an honest and serious debate about the 
introduction of the BIG in Namibia. However, we cannot 
tolerate ideologically-driven propaganda that chooses to 
ignore scientific evidence. NEPRU's misleading and 
incorrect comments on the actual results of the BIG in 
Otjivero-Omitara, has exposed NEPRU's position as 
unethical and extremely biased favouring the rich and 
powerful while trampling on the poor. We wonder if NEPRU 
has published its dismal BIG comments due to a lack of skills 
and knowledge, due to its own political agenda, or simply to 
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force themselves onto the debate and thereby secure 
financial resources for future work.  In  any  event,  NEPRU  
acted to the detriment of the people in Otjivero-Omitara and 
the project as a whole. At a time when the Head of State and 
Government including the Founding President, Members of 
the Cabinet of the Republic of Namibia and elected 
Representatives of Parliament have reacted positively to the 
first BIG impact assessment report, NEPRU aligns itself 
with some conservative white farmers, certain elements in 
the German Embassy and the discredited neo-liberal 
Bretton Woods Institutions in a calculated attempt to 
discredit this initiative. This constitutes a subversion of the 
national interest. 
NEPRU has rather discredited itself and is hence unable to 
contribute constructively to the BIG debate. The only decent 
thing left to do, is for NEPRU to apologise to the people of 
Otjivero-Omitara and the Namibian public in general. The 
BIG deserves an honest debate in terms of its proven ability 
to reduce poverty significantly. 
(Own emphases, BIG Coalition 2008b) 
This response is extremely interesting, as the coalition claims to have conducted 
scientific research, and is officially willing to discuss the proposal openly. This strong 
attack might be understood from the perspective of social legitimacy. The coalition 
seems to perceive the criticism by NEPRU to the questioning of the social legitimacy of 
the  work  of  the  coalition.  The  coalition  uses  the  very  language  it  claims  the  research  
institute of using. However, the short article by NEPRU does not use emotional 
language, only refers to the possibility of miscalculations, and gives a cautious voice to 
the interpretation of the results. In its statement, BIG Coalition makes it clear that it is 
only willing to engage in discussion “in terms of its proven ability to reduce poverty 
significantly” (2008b). In practice this means, that only a positively-toned discussion on 
the BIG grant is allowed.34 
Otjivero Citizens Step in 
The emotional emphasis on the matter was emphasized by New Era as it reported on the 
viewpoints of the Otjivero citizens towards the grant 6 November 2008 (Tjaronda 
2008f). The entrepreneurs and the principal of the school, and ordinary people living in 
the village were interviewed from their positive stands on the grant. Even the shop 
owner of Omitara came out as saying he was “not opposed to the grant because he lives 
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off it as well. But more control mechanisms could have been put in place to ensure that 
the money is properly used” (2008A). “Some Otjivero residents feel that the opponents 
of  BIG  are  those  with  everything  and  do  not  sleep  on  empty  stomachs,”  the  article  
stated (2008A). This newspaper article shows, that the journalist has been willing to 
contribute to the debate in a seemingly objective way, by asking the people themselves 
how they perceive the grant. However, this article does not address the claims made by 
NEPRU, although it is published after the debate between the two organizations. 
In December 2008, The Namibian reported that NEPRU had corrected its view on BIG: 
“The average expenditure figures provided in the assessment report of the Basic Income 
Grant (BIG) Coalition are not suitable for determining the income poverty level,” the 
institute’s press statement was quoted. However, NEPRU did not accept the allegations 
of  the  BIG  Coalition,  concerning  the  favoring  of  rich,  and  the  allegation  of  aligning  
with certain interests. (The Namibian 2008.) 
Osterkamp Responds to the Attack 
This  could  have  been  the  end  of  the  publicity  of  the  matter,  but  one  person  was  not  
ready to swallow the claims made by the BIG Coalition: Dr. Rigmar Osterkamp, the 
initial author of the review by NEPRU, insisted on the right to have his view 
pronounced. His personal comments on the BIG proposal were published in New Era 12 
December 2008 with the headline Basic Income Grant – a Promising Way forward? He 
first mentions that social assistance programs were not intended to be unconditional and 
that the idea of providing an unconditional minimum income “originated in Europe in 
the 18th century”. Value Added Tax of 30% would be one source of funding the grant, 
but according to Osterkamp, it would pose financial macroeconomic problems for 
Namibia unless the neighboring countries of Namibia would follow suit. Osterkamp 
proposes that the funding would not be possible only by increase in taxation, but other 
spending items would need to be reduced. The long-run concequences of the grant 
might be dependency, and he states that “I cannot claim that I am able to provide 
definitive answers to these questions. But I think there are considerable doubts about the 
ability of a universal cash grant to help reduce poverty in the long run - - “ (Osterkamp 
2008). Furthermore, Osterkamp discusses the possibility of the proposal to gain political 
72 
 
support. This is not probable, according to him, as voters would not think the opposition 
parties would be able to execute the proposal country-wide, and the politicians might 
not be keen on doing it either. The financial burden of the grant would be, according to 
Osterkamp, significant, and “political pressure to increase the grant is much more 
probable - -“ and “Thus it may become difficult to keep the cash grant reasonably 
affordable once it is introduced” (Osterkamp 2008). He gives other reasons for his 
opinion, and concludes that “The introduction of a universal cash grant would make 
governing the country more difficult, politically and financially” (2008). Finally, he 
states that “One could regard the cash grant project as just another imported 
development fashion, promoted by foreign (here German) donor money. But there may 
be a “higher” idea behind it: some of the donors may, in effect, have Germany and not 
Namibia in mind. Those wishing to introduce cash grant programmes in Germany might 
find Namibia a convenient “laboratory” in which their proposals may be tested more 
easily” (2008). 
At this point, the public dialogue between the BIG Coalition and NEPRU had ceased to 
exist. Despite this, the claims of the Coalition continued. In April 2009, Claudia 
Haarmann commented on the lack of the BIG proposal in the National budget, and 
simultaneously took the opportunity to comment on the criticism. “The coalition 
exposed methodological errors in the NEPRU research to which the institution acceded 
and Osterkamp returned to Germany in disgrace” (Van den Bosch 2009). This lead 
Osterkamp to respond publicly in New Era, stating that “I wouldn’t have reacted to this 
interview were it not part of a longer sequence of, let me call it, uncivilized behavior 
against me” (Osterkamp 2009a). He claimed that “Mr and Mrs Haarmann, both priests 
of the Evangelical church and doctoral academics, cancelled a presentation about their 
BIG assessment report in NEPRU’s Lunchtime Seminar, planned since long” (2009a). 
He continues describing insults by Claudia Haarmann in the press conference organized 
by the coalition and by Dirk Haarmann in a “semi-official” meeting. Furthermore, 
Osterkamp had not received an answer to his analysis of the proposal, mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, and not from “Haarmann’s German employer, the Vereinte 
Missionsanstalt,” to where he had written a letter concerning the behavior of the priests. 
He furthermore insists on flaws in the research conducted by the coalition, and 
concludes “I think that Namibia and the country’s poor deserve a sober and professional 
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debate about the BIG, not the “Hurrah!” type of publications produced by an in-group 
of partisans” (2009a). 
This perspective was confirmed in the interview with Rigmar Osterkamp 19 July 2009. 
I asked his opinion concerning the criticism towards him by the representatives of the 
Coalition. His view was that the coalition might have something to hide, and this would 
be the reason for aggressive behavior. He was of the opinion that further research 
concerning the BIG proposal would be needed. He had not been able to access the 
information collected by the Coalition, with the exception of the booklets published. He 
also mentioned some methodological errors concerning the pilot project. One of these 
was the lack of internal funding of the grant in Otjivero. As elsewhere in Namibia, the 
income distribution in the village is highly unequal. Therefore there would have been an 
opportunity to look at this perspective as well. This would have been important, 
because, according to Osterkamp, the funding of the grant is not at all as simple as the 
coalition proposes. Finally, Osterkamp speculated on the motivations behind the 
proponents of the grant. According to him, the international discourse concerning the 
BIG proposal is very important in this context. The German BIG proponents are closely 
related to the Namibian proponents, and according to Osterkamp, the aim might be to 
also benefit the German BIG movement. In addition to this, the motivations of Dirk and 
Claudia Haarmann might be to financially and academically benefit from the success of 
the proposal in Namibia. (Osterkamp 2009b.) 
Urge to Maintain Social Legitimacy 
According to my analysis, at the beginning, NEPRU was willing to take part into the 
discussion on the basic income proposal in Namibia. Osterkamp was perhaps a bit 
suspicious concerning the results, and by criticizing them, he was perceived to question 
the legitimacy of the work of the BIG Coalition. In case he had not questioned it before, 
it became clear that he did so after the official attack from the coalition. The answer to 
NEPRU’s critique works in a similar way than with the case of IMF: The BIG Coalition 
answers to the questions concerning the basic income proposal by questioning the 
legitimacy of the questioner. By using very emotional language the coalition, perhaps 
unintentionally, reveals the questionability of its own work: Instead of answering to the 
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questions presented, the coalition uses ad hominem arguments  to  denigrate  those  who 
propose other opinions. The social legitimacy provided by certain institutions such as 
IMF or NEPRU, is not as vital to the work of the BIG Coalition, as the social legitimacy 
provided by the government. Therefore the answer to criticism is quite different in the 
following case. 
No BIG for the Political Leaders 
Prime Minister Nahas Angula was initially slightly positive towards the basic income 
proposal in Namibia. 09 May 2005 he was quoted in New Era: “Prime Minister Nahas 
Angula said it was gratifying to note that the civil sector is looking out for the needs of 
disadvantaged groups in society. - - While at the same time welcoming the idea, Angula 
said more needs to be done to integrate it with other existing social benefit schemes.” 
However, at that time, the Prime Minister also mentioned that expansion of the 
economy would be needed in order to finance the grant. (Gaomas 2005) Only a year 
later, this tone had changed. Nahas Angula, speaking on behalf of Cabinet announced 
that the proposal is not affordable. “Angula said if the BIG was indeed believed to be a 
priority,  Government  would  need  to  abolish  its  existing  subsidies  and  grants  to  make  
money available.” However, Angula gave “the coalition and its partners the option of 
raising a fraction of the amount needed for the implementation of the BIG - -”. (Isaacs 
2006b.) 
What  was  the  response  of  the  BIG  Coalition  to  this?  Compared  to  the  previous  
examples, it was more than mild. “Bishop Zephania Kameeta, said they did not see the 
response from Government as “very negative”. He said the decision did not mean the 
end of the BIG idea - - . He said Cabinet had not “closed the door” on them yet” (Isaacs 
2006b).  The  frustration  of  the  coalition  came  out  in  another  form,  as  the  national  
television channel had published parts of the meeting in the news report. Bishop 
Kameeta was quoted saying “While the meeting was held in camera, no journalists had 
been invited and the delegation understood this as a non-public meeting” (Isaacs 
2006c). In this case it was not the rejection itself, but the publicity of it, that gained the 
attention of the BIG Coalition. This supports the perspective where the social legitimacy 
is  sought  for.  The  coalition  seems  to  react  furiously,  if  the  legitimacy  of  its  work  is  
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publicly questioned. In response to the Cabinet decision, Kameeta announced that the 
BIG Coalition will search for alternative ways of funding the proposal (Isaacs 2006c, 
Sibeene 2006). 
The BIG Coalition continued its work organizing workshops, and setting up the pilot 
project. Years later, as the pilot project was being drawn into conclusion, Prime 
Minister Angula came out strongly opposing the grant. As a youth delegation had 
visited him in October 2009, he was quoted saying that the grant was being as even the 
richest people would be eligible to receive the grant. Instead, he said, other social grant 
schemes could be considered in the Namibian context. The coalition’s response to this 
was to rely on the results of the pilot project and to argue that the scheme was indeed 
affordable,  and  the  best  solution  to  the  reduction  of  poverty.  At  the  same time it  was  
quoted of calling for “constructive and honest debate about the BIG concept”. 
(Shejavali 2009.) 
The viewpoint of the Prime Minister was supported by President Hifikepunye Pohamba, 
who, according to The Namibian, answered to the Parliament in April 2010 that dishing 
out money would lead to exploitation and “encourage people to do nothing” (Kisting 
2010a). To this, Kameeta answered on behalf of the BIG Coalition, that he doesn’t 
“want any quarrels with anyone including the President” (Kisting 2010b). However, 
Kameeta  reminded  that  poverty  was  a  severe  problem  in  Namibia  and  that  the  “BIG  
pilot project at Omitara spoke for itself” (2010b). 
These two examples concerning the opinions of Prime Minister and President show that 
the BIG Coalition faces challenges in convincing the political leadership of the country. 
Although the coalition might have the social legitimacy in large part of the civil society, 
the key political figures do not hesitate to disagree with them. This creates a problem, as 
the coalition cannot openly disagree with the state leaders in a way it has disagreed for 
example with Osterkamp. In the light of the comments made by the President and the 
Prime Minister, the coalition does not seem to have the social legitimacy in the eyes of 
the government. However, the legitimacy of the government is not questioned by the 
BIG Coalition, as was the case with IMF and NEPRU. The explanation to this lies in the 
concept of social legitimacy as a resource: The BIG Coalition urgently needs to 
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maintain or gain social legitimacy by the government of Namibia, in order to attain its 
aim: the introduction of countrywide basic income grant. Therefore, it cannot discredit 
the government in a similar way it has done with other, less significant organizations. 
 “Greedy Shop-owner just wants more money” 
 
Picture 5: The shop-owner of Omitara (BIG Coalition 2008: 91) 
This case looks into the objection of the white shop-owner in the village of Omitara, the 
only person whose critical opinion has been discussed in detail in the Assessment 
Report by the BIG Coalition. The coalition has headlined the criticism as “Debt” (BIG 
Coalition 2008a: 90). The shop owner is quoted saying that he was expecting higher 
turn-out of the grant to his shop. This perspective was confirmed in the personal 
interview with him (Omitara 13.6.2008b). The booklet suggests that the motivations of 
the shop-owner are his personal interests of financial gain and proposes a critical 
approach to his thinking from the very beginning: 
A fourth criticism is a strange one, that a BIG increases 
indebtedness. On the contrary, evidence from cash transfer 
programmes in other parts of Africa has shown that such 
transfers enable people to reduce their debt, and thus enable 
them to invest to build their livelihoods. 
This particular criticism has been made by the owner of the 
Omitara bottle store/general dealer, who says that since the 
start of the BIG pilot, debt at his shop has increased. 
According to him, he was prepared to provide goods on 
credit because of the BIG. He thus contributed to the growth 
77 
 
of consumer debt himself. Note however, that the evidence 
from our survey does not indicate an increase in household 
debt to shops before and after the BIG. If debt has indeed 
risen in his shop, this appears not to be part of a wider trend. 
- - 
As far as paying off debt is concerned, his statement should 
be weighed against one made by a woman who sells food 
items in the settlement: 
 
Picture 7: “Several tuck shops were established after the introduction of the BIG”  
(BIG Coalition 2008: 92) 
“I have observed a lot of good things happening [after the 
BIG]. Many families did not have any food to feed 
themselves, but now with the BIG money they can afford to 
buy food. In the past, I would give them things on credit from 
my shop, but most of them could not pay back. But now they 
are paying back which is also good for my business.” 
(Tuhafeni Veshiyele) 
In sum, leaving aside the very personal statements of one 
businessman, there is no reason to believe that the standard 
criticisms of the BIG are supported by the experience and 
statistics gathered since the beginning of the BIG pilot 
project in Otjivero-Omitara. 
This way of discussing this criticism is interesting. Rather than aggressively answering 
to the criticism in public (such as in the cases of IMF and NEPRU), or looking for the 
positive  sides  of  the  critique  (such  as  in  the  cases  of  the  Prime  Minister  and  the  
President), the coalition has decided to include this perspective to the official 
publication concerning the findings. However, this is done in a very suggestive way. 
The criticism by the shop-owner is “strange one” as the “evidence from our survey does 
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not indicate an increase in household debt to shops before and after the BIG” (BIG 
Coalition 2008: 90). In an interview with the shop-owner he explained that he was 
initially skeptical towards the idea of selling items in advance for the grant. Therefore 
he created a list of those who had debts, and had agreed to pay back from the grant. If 
these people were to pay back their debts, he would have taken new people to the list. 
This list was public and can be seen in picture 6. According to my interview, the shop 
owner had not received the payments of the debts, and therefore he refused to take more 
people to the payment list. This would also explain why the increased indebtedness did 
not show on the research of the BIG Coalition. (Omitara 13.6.2008b.) 
The  opinion  of  this  shop  owner  was  presented  by  the  BIG  Coalition  against  another  
opinion also quoted above. This second opinion was more trustworthy from the 
viewpoint of the coalition, due to reasons left unexplained in the booklet. The pictures 
of this chapter also emphasize the attitude of the coalition: Both the shop-owner and the 
tuck shop-owner are pictured behind the counters of their shop. However, the pictures 
are quite different. The first picture presents a middle-aged white man behind the bars 
of his shop, and the original text states “Bottle store / general dealer in Omitara is 
sceptical about the BIG” (BIG Coalition 2008: 91). The second picture presents a young 
black woman with her child in her “tuck shop” (2008: 92). This juxtaposition between 
the rich and the poor – the bad and greedy against those who are good and have nothing 
is well presented in these two pictures. The booklet also refers in a footnote to a “self-
contradictory” statement by the shop-owner without further explanation. 
The conclusion of the booklet is that the shop-owner of Omitara has come to oppose the 
grant as the competition has increased in the village, and thus posed “an economic 
threat” to him (BIG Coalition 2008: 91). This view was also confirmed by Dirk 
Haarmann, whom I met during the payout day of June 2008. He asked me whether I had 
met the shop-owner and then commented that he is a man of business (Omitara 
16.6.2008). In my interview, the shop-owner emphasized that he did not want the 
money to be taken away from the people, but he wanted some control measures to be 
put in place so that the grant would not have been misused (Omitara 13.6.2008). He did 
not hide his frustration over the situation, where he had to balance between his business 
on one hand, and on the other hand face the accusations of being heartless and cruel as 
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he refused to sell more items on credit to the hungry and poor people of the settlement 
(13.6.2008). 
Unlike with the critique by IMF and NEPRU, the BIG Coalition does not aggressively 
criticize the critique posed by the shop owner of Omitara. However, it uses the same 
method of devaluing his opinions by using ad hominem argument  as  the  view  of  a  
businessman is emphasized. This example may serve as a quest for social legitimacy in 
a certain way: It is one of the rare critiques discussed in the publication of the BIG 
Coalition, but by publishing the view of the shop owner, the coalition can claim it has 
published an alternative opinion concerning the proposal. Therefore it can claim to have 
fulfilled the requirements of “open and honest debate,” and further devalue the 
comments stating otherwise. 
6.3 Search for Legitimacy: Successes and Failures 
The BIG Coalition has sought for social legitimacy in various ways. It has chosen those 
who are the legitimate spokespeople of the organization, but it has failed to grant the 
legitimacy in situations where its work, or the coalition itself, has come under criticism. 
The underlying reason can only be speculated here, but there is one thing in common in 
the cases above: The BIG Coalition does not discuss the BIG proposal itself in public, 
but searches to discredit those who oppose their arguments, or claims that the rejection 
of their proposal is not total. An example of the latter can be seen in the case of the 
Prime Minister and the President. Unfortunate for the coalition, the attacks towards 
those who have proposed alternative views have diminished the possibility to gain 
social legitimacy from these critiques. It seems that the coalition does not value those 
who have proposed counter-arguments, except for those whose arguments they do not 
see as a total rejection. Therefore, they do not seem to value the social legitimacy 
provided by the organizations such as IMF and NEPRU. 
The Namibian BIG Coalition has continued in the footsteps of its predecessor, South 
African BIG Coalition, in its way to respond to the criticism. As seen earlier, the first 
coalition also used this way of discrediting those who opposed the basic income 
proposal or had suggestions for alterations in it. This attitude might have influenced the 
opinion of politicians, academics and wider public. By questioning the legitimacy of 
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those who comment on the proposal, the BIG Coalition has revealed the questionability 
of the legitimacy of its own actions. This will be discussed in detail in the final chapter 
of data analysis. 
7. Legitimizing the Action – Propositions about Policy and Practice 
7.1 The Pilot Project and its Relation to the Coalition 
The BIG Coalition has come a long way from the South African proposal in the end of 
1990’s to the conclusion of the BIG pilot project in Omitara village in the beginning of 
2010. The form of the organization has been the same from the beginning of the time 
period under closer scrutiny. However, there has been a clear change during these years. 
The government lobbyist organization has changed to a development organization, as it 
launched the BIG pilot project. This chapter aims at understanding this new direction of 
the coalition. It also attempts to conclude the answer to the research question and 
discuss the transformation of the coalition as well as analyze the reasons for this change. 
As mentioned earlier, this part follows the propositions concerning policy and practice 
by David Mosse. Four of his five propositions are relevant to this research. These 
propositions assist in analyzing the basic income pilot project. The first proposition 
looks at the motivations behind the project and argues that the project is one way of 
seeking the legitimacy for the work of the coalition. The second argument understands 
the pilot project as being crucial for the BIG Coalition, and not vice versa, unlike it may 
be implied. The third proposal analyses the attempts to keep the coherence of the policy 
proposal. The final proposal, in turn, scrutinizes the concept of “success” as a policy-
oriented judgment, which does not necessarily have a connection to the reality. 
The purpose of this final chapter is to draw together the ideas presented above, and 
enhance  the  understanding  of  the  work  of  the  BIG  Coalition.  The  theory  of  Mosse  is  
based on ethnographic research, and although my research consists of other 
methodology, the ideas of Mosse assist in analyzing the situation of the BIG Coalition 
and its relationship with the pilot project. The concepts and analysis presented above are 
connected here to Mosse’s theory and to the BIG pilot project. The pilot project is one 
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of the most central elements in the work of the BIG Coalition, and therefore it should be 
a visible part in the analysis of the basic income proposal.  
7.2 Mobilising Political Support or Orientating Practice? 
According  to  the  first  argument  in  the  theory  of  David  Mosse  “-  -  a  project  design  is  
itself a bid for political support, a site for coalition building at different levels (that 
continues beyond design)” and as he discusses his own experience from a development 
project from India, “there were strategic silences on questions such as land reform or 
conflicts over tenure, or local corruption or state violence against tribals” (Mosse 2005: 
35). This concludes to the idea of policy maintaining the support: rather legitimizing 
than orientating the practice. In conclusion, the first argument of Mosse builds upon the 
idea of outside-created policy set up in an environment unfamiliar to the implementers. 
Concerning the BIG, the proposal can be seen as the above-mentioned policy 
recommendation. In the light of Mosse's argument, the practice seeks legitimacy, and 
therefore the BIG Coalition is seeking to legitimize the Pilot Project (practice), rather 
than orientating the project to respond to the suggested policy proposal as carefully as 
possible. In conclusion, the BIG Coalition has sought to legitimize the pilot project, and 
to mobilize and maintain political support. 
The BIG Coalition is officially a non-political organization. It does not, for example 
accept political parties as members, although individual contributions are welcomed 
(CoD 2008). During the workshop for the NGOs, the politicization of the BIG proposal 
was one of the concerns of the participants (Brakwater 2009). However, the BIG 
proposal certainly is a policy proposal, as it suggests radical changes to the 
redistribution of government revenue. Therefore, it is not surprising that the coalition 
has number of times called for “political will” to conduct the proposal in the whole 
country (see for example Tjihenuna 2009, NANGOF 2008, BIG Coalition 2008a: 15 
and Tjaronda 2009a). As seen in the data analysis above, the critical observations on 
BIG were not seen positively, as encouraging to orientating practice, but as threat to the 
social  legitimacy  of  the  BIG  proposal  and  to  the  Pilot  Project  (see  for  example  
Osterkamp 2009a and LaRRI 2009). 
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Furthermore, when asked from Dirk Haarmann, if there are any adjustments that could 
be made to the BIG, the answer was “no” (Omitara 16.6.2008). This is not surprising 
when looking at the initial launch of the BIG pilot project: Quoted above, Dirk 
Haarmann mentioned at the launch of the Pilot Project that “it’s basically to get a 
concrete example of how the BIG can work, which we can show Government” (Isaacs 
2007c). It is therefore quite clear the BIG is not a policy proposal open for debate, as the 
fundamentals cannot be changed. Therefore, it has been important for the coalition to 
gain political support – to legitimize the Pilot Project, and the policy proposal – rather 
than engage itself in a public debate on the matter. 
In conclusion, the first proposition of policy and practice does not apply to the BIG 
Coalition – from the official viewpoint: The proposal is not political, as it does not 
involve political parties of Namibia. This analysis contradicts the official view, as the 
BIG is a policy proposal – it calls for a new policy concerning the distribution of funds 
in the country. Some researchers and politicians have engaged in debate with the 
coalition – resulting negative feedback discussed earlier. In my opinion the first 
proposition indeed applies to the BIG proposal: The coalition has had an urge to 
legitimize the Pilot Project and the proposal, but it has not been eager in engaging in an 
open debate concerning the matter. 
7.3 Development Intervention Driven by an Exigency of Organization 
Mosse states: “The fact remains, however, that villagers themselves had little control 
over project processes or budgets. Rather than implementing their own ‘village 
development plan’, they found that components of it (individual schemes and subsidies) 
would be delivered on an item-by-item basis (instead of in logically related bundles) 
(Mosse 2005: 115). This example illustrates the second point of the argument by Mosse: 
“Development interventions are not driven by policy but by the exigencies of 
organisations and the need to maintain relationships” (2005: 15). In the context of 
Namibian basic income grant proposal it is argued that the BIG Pilot Project is not 
driven by the basic income grant policy proposal, but by the need of the BIG Coalition 
to maintain relationships and to maintain the legitimacy of the organization. 
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It has been argued above that the BIG Coalition has provided a policy proposal, but 
there has not been debate on how to adjust the policy to answer the specific needs and 
the situation of Namibia.  Therefore,  it  is  quite probable that the BIG Pilot  Project has 
not been driven by policy, but by the need to gain support for the BIG Coalition. Mosse 
provides an example where he states that the people of the village participating in the 
project had little influence on how the project took place, or was budgeted for. 
The coalition has stated publicly that it has been searching for a village where to 
conduct the BIG experiment, and finally chosen Omitara for this (Isaacs 2007d and 
2008a). No reference has been made to the consultation of the citizens of the village 
about their perception of the project before the launch. The first assessment report of the 
BIG Coalition “Towards a Basic Income Grant for all!” however refers to “healthy 
suspicion towards development aid and outside ‘assistance’, which they saw as short-
term gestures and ill-conceived projects”35 (Basic Income Grant Coalition 2008a: 44.) 
The answer to these suspicions was to bring Bishop Zephania Kameeta, the leading 
public figure in support of the grant, to the village, to “allay some of their fears” (ibid.). 
In response to this, a village committee was formed, which, according to the coalition, 
was “an entirely organic process initiated and developed by the community itself 
without outside interference” (ibid.). This report provides information on the suspicions 
of the people living at the village, but not on how the fears were allayed. This project 
was also planned outside the village, and brought in without further discussion36. 
An outsider perspective to the pilot project has been challenging to find. The coalition 
has been an efficient gatekeeper of the village, as the newspaper articles nationally and 
internationally reflect the ideas of the coalition, and suitable village members are chosen 
to be the representatives of Omitara/Otjivero to outsiders. The access to the village itself 
was  actually  relatively  easy  to  acquire,  as  the  people  of  Omitara  were  welcoming  to  
outsider observant, especially when the pilot project began in 2008. In 2009, however, 
there were certain people who did not want to talk to outsiders at all, or offered to 
discuss, but not about the BIG (Omitara 20.6.2009). An encounter with a woman from 
the  committee  made  it  clear  that  the  BIG Coalition  did  not  want  outsiders  to  visit  the  
village by themselves, as people could, according to her, be saying wrong things about 
the project (Omitara 20.6.2009). 
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The  official  and  the  critical  perspective  to  the  BIG  as  conducting  development  
intervention refer to a non-participatory approach. People were ‘convinced’ of the good 
intentions  of  the  project,  and  they  were  allowed to  build  their  local  committee  for  the  
BIG. However, the people were not asked to contribute to the project, not financially or 
by debate. The structure of the project strongly supports the BIG Coalition in its work, 
and despite the claims of the coalition not to intervene (Omitara 16.6.2008), it has 
certainly made itself visible and well-known in the village by for example delivering the 
grant during the first months of the project (ibid.). This would refer to the need to 
maintain the role and legitimacy of the BIG Coalition in the pilot project. 
7.4 Maintaining Coherent Policy Ideas 
Mosse states that “all development projects - - work to maintain themselves as coherent 
policy ideas – as systems of representations – as well as operational systems.” (Mosse 
2005: 159.) One of the most interesting parts of Mosse’s argument entwines around the 
project representation to outsiders. According to Mosse, presenting the project as a 
coherent policy system is vital to development projects. This is an interesting viewpoint 
from the perspective of the BIG Coalition. The argument here is, that the BIG Project 
works to maintain itself as a coherent policy idea (as a system of representation), as well 
as an operational system. This has been important when outsiders have been brought to 
the village, and might explain the hostile attitude by a representative of the village 
committee, which was encountered when visiting the village in 2009 (Omitara 
20.6.2009). 
Mosse  describes  the  rituals  of  development  projects  where  the  visitors  to  the  projects  
are “honoured but controlled” (Mosse 2005: 166). Furthermore, Mosse argues that 
“visitor ignorance of project practices is not individual but institutional” (2005: 167). 
Mosse refers to the visits done by the donors, but this applies to the other visits to the 
village, controlled by donors (BIG Coalition), as well. By looking closer to the BIG 
Pilot Project village, it can be seen that the project practices are indeed institutionalized. 
As mentioned above, the BIG Committee members were well aware of their role in the 
project, and either granted or denied the possibility to walk around freely and discuss 
with people of the village (Omitara 31.5.2008 and 20.6.2009). Finally, Mosse states that 
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“As much as anything, then, visits helped to secure project success. Visitors remained 
ignorant of the contradictions of the project, or unable to criticize the dominant 
interpretations offered” (Mosse 2005: 167). This applies to the other than donor visitors 
to the BIG project village as well: There has been no criticism (at least in public) 
towards  the  project  by  those  who  have  been  “granted”  an  opportunity  to  visit  the  
village. 
Public support has been maintained by these visits to the village by outsiders such as 
reporters and politicians (Isaacs 2008c, LaRRI 2009). But there is another aspect for the 
closer perspective in maintaining coherent policy ideas, namely the one of maintaining 
the coherence inside the coalition itself. The representatives of the member 
organizations had different viewpoints on sharing the data with outsider researchers (for 
example Osterkamp 2009b and LaRRI 2009), but also different perspectives on the BIG 
proposal. Some, for example openly stated, that the grant should be accompanied by 
education on how to use the additional funds (CCN 2008), something opposing to the 
initial proposal of the coalition. 
Publicly, the BIG Proposal might look like a coherent policy idea without any need for 
“maintaining” coherence. However, a closer scrutiny addresses some elements which 
indicate that the coalition indeed has an urge to present the project as a coherent policy 
system, and therefore there is a need to control the access to the Pilot Project, and to 
refrain from public debate. It should also be mentioned that the incoherence in the 
policy proposal weakens the situation of the coalition, and might reduce its social 
legitimacy in the country. 
7.5 ‘Success’ as a policy-oriented judgment 
In the last part of his argument, Mosse describes the significance of the project to the 
Bhil villagers. This was not connected to the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of the project, but the 
underlying perceptions of the impact (Mosse 2005: 205). These perceptions were both 
positive and negative, and some of the impacts were unintentional (2005: 206-209). The 
benefits of the project were unevenly distributed, as those who already were in 
possession of certain goods, land or education tended to gain a privileged access to the 
benefits (2005: 210-211). In conclusions, Mosse states: “The IBRFP project ‘worked’ in 
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two distinct senses: first, it established itself as an exemplar of policy, generating valid 
interpretations; and second, it had some positive local socio-economic effects. There is 
not necessarily a connection between the two. The project did not work because it 
turned policy into reality. Rather, it sustained policy models offering a significant 
interpretation  of  the  situation.  -  -  In  a  sense,  all  development  programmes  work  
politically through interpretation and the creative capacity of policy to connect 
economic and historical processes of change to its normative schemes” (2005: 231). The 
final argument of Mosse is the following: 'Success’ and ‘failure’ are policy-oriented 
judgements that obscure project effects. In relation to the BIG Pilot project, one could 
state that success of the BIG Pilot Project is a policy-oriented judgement, which 
obscures the project effects. The coalition needed ‘success’ in order to legitimize the 
pilot project and the work of the organization, and therefore the real effects behind this 
façade are difficult to evaluate.  
In the case study of Mosse, the villagers had both positive and negative perceptions of 
the project, and the impacts were sometimes unintentional. Arguably, this is the case 
with the Namibian BIG Project as well. The coalition was quick to claim the BIG Pilot 
Project as success, first public announcement dated as early as 18 February 2008 (Isaacs 
2008d), after the second payout day. Assessment Reports, named “Towards a Basic 
Income Grant for all!” published in September 2008 (BIG Coalition, 2008a) and 
Making the difference! The BIG in Namibia published in April 2009 (BIG Coalition 
2009), claimed the project as success, far before the pilot had finished in December 
2009. The case studies the coalition has brought up in the reports are examples of 
positive local socio-economic effects. However, this claim of ‘success’ does not 
indicate the long-term impacts of the Pilot Project in Omitara/Otjivero village. 
Furthermore, the wider data behind this claim of this success has been impossible to 
reach (Haarmann & Palomäki 2009, Osterkampb 2009). Therefore, despite the positive 
socio-economic effects of the project, a larger impact of the BIG for the whole Namibia 
is difficult to scrutinize, especially in the light of the BIG Pilot Project. 
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7.6 Conclusion: BIG Pilot Project, Policy and Practice 
This chapter has taken a look into the BIG pilot project through David Mosse’s 
proposals concerning policy and practice. First, it was stated that the BIG pilot project 
was  designed  to  gain  political  support  for  the  BIG Coalition,  rather  than  to  search  for  
the best practice in this specific case. Although the BIG Coalition has formally changed 
from an organization supporting the idea of basic income into an organization 
conducting development cooperation, the background idea for the work of the coalition 
has not changed. The BIG pilot project is an attempt to mobilize political support, not to 
orientate practice. Second, the development intervention, which in this case is the pilot 
project,  was  driven  by  the  exigency  of  the  BIG  Coalition.  The  coalition  needs  social  
legitimacy in order to gain support for the BIG policy proposal, and therefore the 
criticism towards the pilot project or its results could not be tolerated. The social 
legitimacy was also sought for while maintaining coherent policy ideas. Therefore, there 
were  only  certain  people  who  were  legitimate  spokespeople  of  the  BIG  Coalition.  
Finally, the term “success” was a policy-oriented judgment rather than a verified result 
of the research. 
Social  legitimacy,  policy  and  practice  have  been  the  key  terms  of  this  chapter.  It  has  
been observed that the BIG Coalition has not transformed significantly during the time 
period under scrutiny, although the tasks set for the coalition have changed. This final 
results chapter has shown how social legitimacy for one policy proposal has been 
sought for in the BIG pilot project. Now I will turn once more to the research questions, 
and make the concluding remarks in relation to the results of this thesis. 
8. Conclusion 
The theoretical background for this thesis has included the concepts of NGOs, coalition, 
organizational environment and stakeholders, resource dependence perspective and 
social legitimacy, as well as propositions about policy and practice. The research 
question was formulated based on these concepts: How has the Namibian BIG 
Coalition been formed and transformed during the time period between 2003 and 
2009? A number of supporting questions were included in the study: What kind of an 
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organization the BIG Coalition is? How have the BIG proposal and the BIG Coalition 
been formed in respect to critical events? How is the social legitimacy maintained in the 
work of the BIG Coalition? 
8.1 Formation and Transformation of the BIG Coalition in Namibia 
The thesis has looked into the formation and transformation of the BIG Coalition in 
Namibia. The work of the coalition has begun already in South Africa, and the coalition 
form has been transferred to Namibia. The proposal has been brought up in several 
occasions, and the Namibian press has been devoted to report on these occasions 
regularly. As the proposal was not taken up actively by the Namibian government, the 
coalition decided to implement the BIG pilot project in one Namibian village. This 
changed the character of the coalition from a loose lobbying coalition into a 
development organization. 
The transformation of the BIG Coalition from a lobbying organization to a development 
organization seemed to be rather smooth. However, the coalition faced challenges in 
combining its role as it was simultaneously lobbying for the grant, conducting the pilot 
project, and undertaking research on the subject. The coalition was protective towards 
the pilot project, and as it was striving to maintain social legitimacy, it had to respond 
even  to  light  criticism in  an  aggressive  way.  This  worked  against  the  coalition,  as  the  
results of the project could not be evaluated by those who work outside the 
organization, and therefore the legitimacy of the work could not be verified. 
8.2 BIG Coalition as an Organization 
One of the chapters presented the structure of the BIG Coalition, the central elements in 
the analysis of coalitions, as well as analyzed the environment and the stakeholders. 
Two cases concerning the relations with the stakeholders were presented. It was 
observed that the BIG Coalition might not only be understood as a coalition. Members 
of the coalition do not always have close linkages to their own member organizations, 
and therefore the BIG Coalition can be understood as a network of organizations. 
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The coalition has lobbied for the implementation of the basic income grant in Namibia. 
The history of this organization reaches back to South Africa, where a very similar 
proposal has been discussed couple of years earlier. The formation of the Namibian 
coalition has been followed, and its environment and stakeholders has been analyzed. 
One of the chapters took a look into the BIG pilot project through David Mosse’s 
proposals concerning policy and practice. It was argued that the BIG pilot project was 
designed to gain more political support for the BIG Coalition, not to search for the best 
practice in relation to the development of Omitara/Otjivero village.  
8.3 Formation of the BIG Proposal and the Critical Events 
The basic income grant proposal has been the very same throughout the years, but the 
role  of  the  BIG  Coalition  in  Namibia  has  changed.  First  it  was  a  network  of  
organizations, which supported the idea of basic income. Gradually the idea of piloting 
the proposal in a Namibian village was presented, and finally the BIG Coalition 
launched the project, and in this way became an organization for development 
cooperation, which simultaneously claimed to do research concerning the project. The 
aim was not, however, to bring development to Omitara as such, but to show that the 
basic income would have so positive results, that the government would be willing to 
implement it on a national level.  
The Namibian BIG Coalition has continued the work of its South African counterpart. 
However, the Desk for Social Development of ELCRN church claim the proposal has 
been brought up by Namibian Tax Consortium, which indeed recommended further 
scrutiny concerning BIG – in one of its eighteen recommendations. The BIG Coalition 
was taken up by DfSD, and the proposal was discussed in the Namibian media. 
However, the government did not support the proposal, and the BIG Coalition sought 
for support elsewhere. After presenting the idea of BIG in a UN meeting, it announced 
the pilot project of BIG, which was organized in Omitara during the years 2008 and 
2009. Despite a number of clashes with the environment, the coalition continued the 
pilot project until the end of 2009, and claimed the project as success. 
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8.4 Maintaining and Creating Social Legitimacy 
The history of NGOs was briefly presented in chapter 2.3. It was mentioned that the role 
of NGOs in advocacy work has increased in the past decades, and it can be seen that the 
BIG Coalition is one example of this. I also mentioned that the discussion concerning 
the legitimacy of the work of these NGOs has also increased recently. This thesis has 
also discussed this perspective, as the legitimacy of the actions of the coalition has been 
under scrutiny, and also the search for social legitimacy by the coalition has been 
analyzed. 
It has been argued that social legitimacy is the key resource for the BIG Coalition, and 
therefore it has sought for it in various ways. The coalition has also responded quite 
aggressively when the legitimacy of its work or the very existence of the coalition has 
been questioned. The Namibian BIG Coalition has continued in the footsteps of its 
predecessor,  South  African  BIG  Coalition,  in  its  way  to  respond  to  the  criticism.  As  
discussed earlier, the first coalition also used this way of discrediting those who 
opposed the basic income proposal or had suggestions for alterations in it. This attitude 
might have influenced the opinion of politicians, academics and wider public. By 
questioning the legitimacy of those who comment on the proposal, the BIG Coalition 
has revealed the questionability of the legitimacy of its own actions. 
The BIG Coalition has built its relations and sought for legitimacy in the environment in 
a  number  of  ways.  Two  case  studies  showed  the  influence  of  South  African  BIG  
Coalition, and on the other hand, described the influence of the Namibian coalition to a 
number of NGOs in a workshop. The latter example showed how the representatives of 
the BIG Coalition use their power to prove their legitimacy in the NGO sector. The 
representatives are capable of convincing their audience when the largest part of it 
consists of the representatives of civil society. 
It has been argued that those who are the legitimate spokespeople of the BIG Coalition 
are also those who formulate the official opinions. This view has been supported by the 
fact that some of these spokespeople have been active in the South African BIG 
Coalition. These people have also answered to the critique, presented here in four case 
studies. Finally the analysis of the actions of the coalition concerning the BIG pilot 
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project was drawn together in the propositions about policy and practice by David 
Mosse, where they were analyzed the light of the BIG pilot project. 
The BIG Coalition has been preoccupied in maintaining its political support and 
legitimizing its own work and the BIG Pilot Project. This has lead to an unfortunate 
situation, where part of the very relevant information for a debate about the positive and 
negative sides and effects of the grant have not been made public. Instead, the Coalition 
has claimed the pilot project as successful before the end of the project, and it has not 
shown signs of discussing the possible alternatives to the Basic Income Grant in 
Namibia. This is not to say that the BIG Pilot Project has failed; it is possible, that the 
grant has had positive effect on the lives of individual members of Omitara/Otjivero 
village. However, the coalition does not provide sufficient information for drawing 
further conclusions in whether the BIG could be regarded as a solution to the poverty in 
Namibia. 
Although the BIG Coalition has formally changed from an organization supporting the 
idea of basic income into an organization conducting development cooperation, the 
background idea for the work of the coalition has not changed. It was argued that the 
BIG pilot project is an attempt to mobilize political support, not to orientate practice. 
The development intervention, which in this case was the BIG pilot project, was driven 
by the exigency of the BIG Coalition. The coalition needs social legitimacy in order to 
gain support for the BIG policy proposal, and therefore the criticism towards the pilot 
project or its results could not be tolerated. The social legitimacy was also sought for 
while maintaining coherent policy ideas. Therefore, there were only certain people who 
were legitimate spokespeople of the BIG Coalition. Finally, the term “success” was 
understood as a policy-oriented judgment rather than a verified result of the research. 
8.5 Overall Conclusion 
The Namibian BIG Coalition has brought up a vivid discussion concerning basic 
income in Namibia. It has taken influence from its South African counterparts, but also 
from Namtax consortium. There are several examples which show the close relationship 
between the Namibian and South African proposals, although these are not openly 
discussed in public. However, the basic income proposal has gained support among 
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Namibian civil society sector, as there is a number of member NGOs in the Namibian 
BIG Coalition, and the feedback from other organizations has often been positive. 
The coalition has, however, failed in convincing the researchers on the impact of the 
BIG pilot project of Omitara/Otjivero village, as it has not been transparent in 
presenting  the  methodology  and  the  results  of  the  research.  The  key  politicians  of  
Namibia,  including  the  President  and  the  Prime  Minister,  are  not  convinced  of  the  
background idea of the BIG Coalition either, and therefore it seems that the coalition 
has not been successful in lobbying for the basic income grant in Namibia. 
The coalition has been striving for attaining social legitimacy in its environment, and it 
has indeed succeeded on certain occasions, and failed on others. It has questioned the 
legitimacy of those who have commented on the proposal, and it has refrained from 
commenting on majority of the criticism. The suggestion for basic income is a policy 
proposal, and therefore it has been vital to the coalition to assure the politicians of the 
country in its importance. The basic income pilot project was conducted in order to 
show that basic income would work, not to seek for the best possible way of developing 
the pilot project village. Therefore the role of the BIG Coalition has been threefold: On 
one hand its task has been to assure the politicians and the public of the good aspects of 
basic income proposal. On the other hand, it has been working as an organization 
conducting development cooperation, as it has conducted the BIG pilot project. Finally, 
the coalition has claimed to be doing research on the pilot project village. By 
conducting  individually  these  three  roles,  the  legitimacy  of  the  work  of  the  BIG  
Coalition can be questioned: It is impossible to conduct objective research on something 
that  has  already  been  branded  as  a  success,  and  by  somebody  who  is  not  willing  to  
discuss alternatives to the proposal. 
The  Namibian  Basic  Income  Grant  Coalition  presents  an  interesting  example  on  how  
development NGOs can function. The perspective of social legitimacy as a resource has 
assisted in understanding, why certain actions have been made by the organization. This 
is something that might assist in understanding the work of other development 
organizations, especially of those that have aims at changing specific policies. A closer 
analysis on the background and the environment of these organizations assists in 
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understanding why do organizations transform, and why they respond in certain ways 
when they perceive that their social legitimacy is questioned. 
8.6 Future of the BIG Coalition 
To this date, the government of the Republic of Namibia has not taken up the proposal 
of  the  BIG  Coalition,  and  it  does  not  seem  probable  that  it  will  do  so  in  the  nearby  
future.  The  Pilot  Project  for  BIG came to  an  end  in  2009,  and  the  coalition  will  now 
continue to support the village by other means (Shejavali 2009b). This means that the 
official aim of the BIG Coalition has not been reached and the attempt to apply the 
policy into practice has not been realized. 
The work of the Namibian BIG Coalition seems, however, to continue. For example the 
homepage continues to be updated, and articles concerning the proposal are still 
discussed  in  the  media.  For  now  it  seems  that  the  Coalition  will  not  publish  its  final  
report, but has changed the name of the April 2009 report as final. Further information 
concerning the project is not likely to be available, as the representatives of the coalition 
have not been willing to share it openly during the pilot project either. It seems that Dirk 
and Claudia Haarmann have left the BIG Coalition as their homepage states that they 
have worked for the coalition until April 2010, and that they are currently “Directors of 
the ‘Theological Institute for Advocacy and Research in Africa’ (TARA)” (Haarmann 
& Haarmann 2010)37. 
The basic income proposal has gained support among a number civil society groups in 
Namibia, and their influence to the government remains to be seen. The Namibian BIG 
Coalition might not have gained legitimacy from all sectors of its environment, but 
some do seem to support the proposal. Whether the discussion concerning the basic 
income will fade in the following years remains yet to be seen. 
8.7 Recommendations for Further Research 
There are at least three very interesting topics I have not been able to concentrate on in 
this research. The first one concerns the role of the donors in relation to the Namibian 
BIG Coalition. It has been speculated that the basic income proposal might have 
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political and financial backing from Germany, and the German donors might be 
interested in using the Namibian case as a laboratory for their own purposes. This leads 
to the relationship of the two sides of the basic income proposal. One concentrates on 
providing social grants in a country where the grants are very small or non-existent, and 
the other side proposes the basic income as something that would clear the current 
bureaucratic system of social grants. It would be interesting for example to compare the 
German discussion on basic income with the Namibian discussion. 
Secondly, a more comprehensive experiment of basic income remains to be seen. The 
Namibian experiment does not take the aspect of funding into account, as donors are 
used  to  fund  the  pilot  project.  This,  to  my understanding,  is  a  severe  limitation  to  the  
experiment, as it certainly is simply more challenging to collect money than share it out. 
The information provided by the BIG Coalition is not enough to draw conclusions 
concerning the basic income policy proposal, and the project would have certainly 
demanded an evaluation from the outside. If the pilot project on basic income was to be 
properly conducted, these two aspects would be fundamental in gaining reliable results. 
Finally, the situation of Namibian politics would need to be studied upon, in order to 
understand the possibility of a policy proposal to be conducted in the country. There are 
several open questions concerning this perspective. For example: Is lobbying efficient? 
Are  there  alternative  ways  of  influencing  the  government?  In  case  the  BIG  Coalition  
would want the basic income to be conducted in the country, it should certainly 
influence the political decision-makers, and do this very effectively. Further research 
would be needed for understanding how this is done in Namibia. 
                                               
Chapter 1 
1See for example the homepage of the Basic Income Earth Network in <http://www.basicincome.org> or 
the U.S. Basic Income Guarantee Network homepage in <http://www.usbig.net/>. 
2 “The HDI – human development index – is a summary composite index that measures a country's 
average achievements in three basic aspects of human development: health, knowledge, and a decent 
standard  of  living.  Health  is  measured  by  life  expectancy  at  birth;  knowledge  is  measured  by  a  
combination of the adult literacy rate and the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrolment 
ratio; and standard of living by GDP per capita (PPP US$).” (UNDP 2009b) 
3 “This indicator [the GINI coefficient] is a summary statistics of the Lorenz Curve. It is a measure of the 
income distribution in a country. It compares the actual distribution to a total equal distribution. The 
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coefficient ranges from 0 to 1. An equal distribution of income gives a coefficient close to 0. The more 
unequal the distribution is the closer the coefficient is to 1. The coefficient gives different results 
depending on how it is calculated. 
In this survey [NHIES] it is calculated on the adjusted per capita income of every single household 
member, which gives a more accurate result. It can also be calculated on average per capita income per 
household or per groups of population or households - - .” (CBS 2006: 24.) 
4 Cunliffe and Erreygers refer to Charles Fourier and his concept of minimum as a Fourierist tradition. 
They also discuss the role of minimum in relation to the analysis by J.S. Mill. (Cunliffe & Erreygers 
2001: 460-466.) 
5 As Van Parijs (2000) also points out, there is a universal basic income in place already in Alaska, United 
States. Although this is not explicitly called Universal Basic Income (which Van Parijs a bit misleadingly 
suggests), it basically fulfills the description given to basic income grant above. The greatest differences 
between the Alaskan version and the BIG are that the money is shared yearly, and it is shared from the 
Alaska Permanent Fund, which comprises of the funds the state receives from oil markets (Goldsmith 
2001). Although, according to Goldsmith, these are not the key aspects of the income to Alaskans, the 
Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) is non-means-tested, and it provides a basic income (2001). This 
program has been in place already since the year 1982 (2001), so it is quite exceptional in the time-scale 
as well. For more information concerning the basic income proposal in the North America, see homepage 
of the U.S. Basic Income Guarantee Network in <http://www.usbig.net/> . 
6 There is another interesting point with the formulation of the Difference Principle. Together with the 
lexical difference principle (where, in perhaps oversimplified terms, the situation of the welfare of the 
worst-off person is first maximized, then the welfare of the second-worst-off, and so on, until the best-off 
person is reached). Rawls comments: “I think, however, that in actual cases this principle is unlikely to be 
relevant, for when the greater potential benefits to the more advantaged are significant, there will surely 
be some way to improve the situation of the less advantaged as well.” (Emphasis added, Rawls 1972: 72.) 
Here Rawls shows that he believes it is not necessary for inequalities to exist as such, since the situation 
of less advantaged can be improved in line with the more advantaged individuals. This can be considered 
as a political argument as well, since it is not always considered even possible to improve the situation of 
the worst-off. This obviously depends on the structure and the political will of the society. 
7Interestingly, Van Parijs uses the word “maximin,” the term Rawls has specifically rejected - when 
discussing the concept of justice - in favor of the Difference Principle (Rawls 1971: 72-73). 
8 To illustrate the situation, Van Parijs brings out the challenge of Crazy and Lazy. In this hypothetical 
world, Crazy and Lazy are living with exactly equal talents, but different lifestyles. While Crazy is 
willing to earn a lot, and work a lot, Lazy is pretty much satisfied with what he has, and not so keen on 
working much. Now, if the grant is “at the highest feasible level,” the net income of Crazy is lower than 
she would like it to be, but Lazy is quite satisfied with what he gets. Van Parijs points out that the high-
grant argument by Rawls seems to support the unfair treatment of Crazy against Lazy. Considering the 
situation further, we need to be reminded of the fact that we are striving for the “maximinning” of real 
freedom, not welfare as such (at least if we want to follow the real-libertarian path). This means that the 
discrimination against some is not justified in favor of the individuals having more expensive taste” 
(1991: 106).  
An extensive discussion concerning Dworkin's work on equality on external resources can be, as with the 
case of “expensive taste,” attained from his article “What is Equality” (from the second part). He 
specifically points out that he is not discussing the idea of political power, but his statements point out to 
interesting ways for the organization of the society nevertheless. His work constitutes a very interesting 
background for the discussion on the basic income, and should definitely be taken up in more theoretical 
context concerning the basic income grant. For details, see Dworkin 1981.  
In order to illustrate Dworkin's point, Van Parijs continues with the already known example of “Crazy” 
and “Lazy”. He mentions that if Crazy and Lazy were endowed an equal plots of land, but they are not 
allowed to trade their plots, the real-libertarian case is not optimal. That is the reason to accept the 
possibility for these individuals to be allowed to trade their pieces of land. Now, according to Van Parijs, 
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the following suggestion arises: “There is a nonarbitrary and generally positive legitimate level of basic 
income that is determined by the per capita value of society's external resources and must be entirely 
financed by those who appropriate these resources. If Lazy gives up the whole of his plot of land, he is 
entitled to an unconditional grant at a level that corresponds to the value of that plot. Crazy, on the other 
hand, can be viewed as receiving this same grant, but as owing twice its amount because of appropriating 
both  Lazy's  share  of  land  and  her  own.  Thus  -  -  the  legitimate  level  of  basic  income  is  just  the  
endogenously determined value of their equal tradable right to land.” ( Van Parijs 1995: 112.) 
Chapter 2 
9 This was due to the inability of the interviewees to provide exact information on their incomes and 
expenditures. A closer scrutiny would have required more detailed analysis, which was impossible to 
conduct due to constrain of time and research capacity. 
10 For a more detailed discussion on the concept of civil society in the context of Africa, see for example 
Harbeson et al (1994) and Comaroff & Comaroff (1999). An interesting detail from the latter publication 
describes critically the artificial formation of the civil society among the so-called bushmen of Namibia 
(Garland 1999). 
11Hatch and Cunliffe remind that “Resource dependence theory elaborated strategic contingency theory’s 
central claim by explaining that the scarcity of critical resources provokes uncertainty, the management of 
which, in turn, produces differential subunit power” (2006: 258). When this power is gained, it can be 
used in institutionalizing the influence, which then again affects the environment. “In other words, 
environments give rise to uncertainty, uncertainty creates opportunities for power differentials among 
organizational units (groups), power differentiations are used to distribute formal authority, those granted 
authority make key decisions that affect organizational actions that change the environment and so on.” 
(2006: 258). Hatch and Cunliffe discuss the work of Salancik and Pfeffer, who claim that the perspective 
becomes political, as the actors dealing well with uncertainty are rewarded with more resources or higher 
status.  
Hatch and Cunliffe discuss the politics of resource dependence referring to the situation where the 
resources are used for creating legitimacy for one’s own position, leading to the dismissal of the core task 
of the organization. This often involves the use of symbols of power, which can include a large variety of 
elements, and brings the symbolic-interpretive approach into the discussion. (2006: 258-259). The 
symbolic-interpretive perspective takes the analysis one step further in the institutionalization theory. 
According to  Hatch  and Cunliffe,  the  work  of  Selznick  elaborated  by  DiMaggio  and Powell  forms the  
basis of this approach. The environments set demands to the organizations in two ways. The first one 
includes “technical, economic and physical demands,” but also “social, cultural, legal or political 
demands” (2006: 86). “Not only do organizations require raw materials, capital, labor, knowledge, and 
equipment, they also depend upon the acceptance of the society in which they operate,” Hatch and 
Cunliffe state (2006: 87). This brings in the concept of social legitimacy. However, this thesis discusses 
the concept directly under the theory of resource dependence, as to my understanding there are no 
limitations to the use of the concept directly under this theory. 
12 The “failure” of the BIG Project would indeed be an interesting topic to discuss. Although the Coalition 
has not succeeded in lobbying the government, it does not mean the BIG Project could be labeled being 
failed. This is a topic to be discussed further in another paper. 
Chapter 3 
13 I have translated the text of Alasuutari for this chapter myself. 
14 An exception to this was made by Uhuru Dempers, who, at the end of my stay of 2009, asked me to 
join the activities of the coalition. However, at that time I had already collected my data, and was leaving 
the country within couple of weeks. 
Chapter 4 
15 The NUNW left the BIG Coalition in July 2010 (Ndjebela 2010), leaving behind speculations of the 
situation of the labour in the country. However, the separation was seen as a stand in line with the official 
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position of the government. As the time period under scrutiny does not reach until the date of separation, I 
only mention it briefly. 
16 These are the loudest spokespeople according to their appearances in the Namibian newspapers, as will 
be discussed later. 
17 ”Six years ago, at the request of their bishop, Haarmann and his wife established the church's social 
welfare group. Since then, they have been living and working on the church premises here in Windhoek, 
attending mass in the morning and devising ways to fight poverty in the afternoon.” (Krahe 2009) The 
translation of an article from der Spiegel reveals that the Desk for Social Development of ELCRN was 
formed in 2003, and that certain bishop was its initiator. In this light, it is entirely possible that the desk 
has been formed for the sole purpose of conducting the BIG experiment and lobbying for the grant.  
18 Namibian dollar is pegged to South African rand and therefore R100=N$100. 
19 The name of NANGOF has recently been changed to Nangof Trust. 
Chapter 5 
20 Other sources refer to “the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for 
South Africa”. appointed by the cabinet. See for example Barchiesi: 2006: 12.  
21 The original reports can be attained from the homepage of Southern African Regional Poverty Network 
(Taylor Committee 2000). 
22 More background information about the BIG proposal in relation to the poverty situation of South 
Africa, from the viewpoint of the South African Coaltiion, can be attained from the Coalition homepage 
(South African BIG Coalition 2003b). 
23 For a more detailed overview of the two BIG Coalitions, please refer to the South African Basic 
Income Grant Coalition homepage at <http://www.big.org.za> and the Namibian Basic Income Grant 
Coalition homepage at <http://www.bignam.org>.  
24 100N$ is approximately equivalent of 10€. 
25 For different definitions of basic income see for example Stuart White (1997), Philippe Van Parijs 
(2002) And Guy Standing & Michael Samson (2003). Although these definitions do differ slightly, it is 
suggested that only these suggestions only emphasize certain aspects, while the essential parts do remain 
the same. 
26 It was interesting to note how the term ”poor” gained positive tone within the context of Omitara pilot 
project. The BIG Coalition was outraged by the claim of Rigmar Osterkamp, whose calculations showed, 
that the inhabitants of Omitara were not poor by certain standards. Although the BIG Coalition argued for 
the universal grant in order to avoid stigmatization, they certainly did not hesitate to point out who are the 
poor people in the Namibian society. 
27 Although the Resource Book does not specifically define the word “capability” in this context, it is 
assumed, that the term refers to Amartya Sen’s Capability approach, see for example Sen’s discussion on 
“Poverty as Capability Deprivation” (Sen 1999: 87). 
28 Note that this approximation of the population size in Namibia differs from the earlier table presented 
in the beginning of the thesis. This is due to the varying estimations depending on the specific year. 
29 Looking at the titles of the representatives of the BIG Coalition consistently would be an interesting 
part of a research. As Zephaniah Kameeta is both a Bishop and a Doctor, and Dirk and Claudia Haarmann 
are both Reverends and Doctors, the titles vary. In a “research paper” as above, Dirk and Clauda 
Haarmann are not Reverends; the reference to churches is therefore ignored. Bishop Kameeta, an 
“influential church leader,” however is mentioned by his doctorate title in this context as well. This can be 
a way to stress the academic nature of the paper. 
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30 This newspaper article discussed the general living conditions of Omitara and the prospects of the BIG 
project. 
31 Republikein – daily Afrikaans newspaper is also published in Namibia. However, the archives of this 
paper are not included in this research. 
32 Shebeen is a small informal shop selling groceries and serving alcohol. For many, it is a place for social 
gathering. 
Chapter 6 
33 Poverty in Namibia is officially calculated by using Cost of Basic Needs (CBN) approach. “Under this 
approach the poverty line is set by first computing the cost of a food basket enabling households to meet a 
minimum nutritional requirement and then an allowance for the consumption of basic non-food items is 
added. Households with consumption expenditure in excess of this threshold are considered non-poor and 
households with expenditure less than the threshold are considered poor” (CBS 2008: 2). 
34 The highlighted parts of BIG Coalition’s response would offer various possibilities for further analysis. 
The claims of “ideologically driven propaganda” and neoliberalism together with claims of being 
“extremely biased favouring the rich and powerful while trampling on the poor” and aligning “with some 
conservative white farmers, [and] certain elements in the German Embassy” indicate the fuelling of the 
discussion concerning racism and poverty in Namibia. These arguments are extreme in the context of an 
ex-colony of Germany, and in the Apartheid history of southern Africa. The way of discrediting an 
“opponent” in this way is certainly not unique to the country, but it  is still  exceptional in the context of 
policy proposals and development projects. Discrediting the opponent on academic terms by claiming that 
the researchers of NEPRU have had to “force themselves onto the debate and thereby secure financial 
resources for future work” is another interesting way to handle criticism. 
35 I never found out why the BIG project was not a “short-term gesture”. The official claim was that the 
government would take over the project after the two year pilot, but the probable situation, where the BIG 
proposal did not gain enough support, was not officially discussed.  
36 It should be pointed out that this is certainly not a unique characteristic of these two development 
projects. 
Chapter 8 
37 The homepage of Dirk and Claudia Haarmann states that “Since April 2010, we are in the process of 
building  up  the  The Theological  Institute  for  Advocacy and Research  in  Africa  (TARA),  together  with  
Bishop  Dr.  Z.  Kameeta  as  patron  and  as  an  initiative  of  the  Lutheran  Communion  in  Southern  Africa  
(LUCSA), supported by the Evangelical Lutheran Mission in Lower Saxony (ELM)  and the Church  
Development Service/Germany (EED). TARA aims at empowering churches in Africa to acquire the 
necessary skills to act prophetically and professionally in their context, taking ownership of local social 
development agendas. The intention is three-fold: Firstly, to train and build capacity locally in Africa and 
to network among the churches. Secondly, to provide expertise to assist and professionally support 
research, analysis and advocacy work amongst local churches, thus fostering expertise in social 
development and concrete involvement of churches in the development of the African continent. Thirdly, 
to render sound information and regional strategic positions on development in a globalized world.” 
(Haarmann & Haarmann 2010) For now, it seems that the basic income proposal is history for Dirk and 
Claudia Haarmann. 
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 Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Platform of the BIG Coalition 
  
Poverty and inequality pose the greatest threat to the success of South 
Africa's young democracy. A bold initiative is urgently needed to 
confront this challenge. 
We, the undersigned organisations, call for the introduction of a 
universal Basic Income Grant as a key intervention to combat poverty 
and to improve the lives of the majority of South Africans.  
At least 22 million people in South Africa--well over half the population--live 
in poverty. On average, they survive on R144 per person per month. A Basic 
Income Grant would provide rapid and sustained relief to all South Africans 
by:  
? providing everyone with a minimum level of income, 
? enabling the nation's poorest households to better meet their basic 
needs, 
? stimulating equitable economic development, 
? promoting family and community stability, and 
? affirming and supporting the inherent dignity of all. 
The Basic Income Grant should be founded on the following fundamental 
principles: 
? Universal Coverage: It should be available to everyone, from cradle 
to grave,and should not be subject to a means test.  
? Relationship to existing grants: It should expand the social security 
net. No individual should receive less in social and assistance grants 
than before the introduction of the Basic Income Grant. 
? Amount: The grant should be no less than R100 per person per month 
on introduction and should be inflation indexed. 
? Delivery Mechanisms: Payments should be facilitated through Public 
Institutions. Using community Post Banks would have the additional 
benefit of enhancing community access to much-needed banking 
services. 
? Financing: A substantial portion of the cost of the grant should be 
recovered progressively through the tax system. This would 
demonstrate solidarity by all South Africans in efforts to eliminate 
poverty. The remaining cost should be borne by the fiscus. A range of 
new measures should be introduced to increase revenue so that the 
additional cost can be accommodated without squeezing out other 
social expenditure. 
 
 In recent weeks, the following organisations have come together to endorse 
this  basic  platform and to commit ourselves to working with government to 
make the Basic Income Grant a reality. We call on all South Africans to join 
us in this campaign and invite them to add their endorsement to this platform. 
Charter Members 
Alliance for Children's Entitlement to Social Security (ACESS)  
Black Sash  
Child Health Policy Institute  
Congress of South African Trade Unions  
Development Resources Centre  
Ecumenical Service for Socio-Economic Transformation  
Gender Advocacy Programme  
Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape  
South African Council of Churches  
South African National NGO Coalition  
Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference  
Treatment Action Campaign  
3 July 2001
 
 
 Appendix 2 
Platform - BIG Coalition 
 
We the undersigned organisations have resolved the following:  
1.  
We note that Namibia has extremely high levels of poverty and the highest incidence of income 
inequality in the world. The reduction of inequality and of poverty needs to be addressed as a top 
priority because social justice is a prerequisite for economic growth and investment in Namibia.  
2.  
We  note  that  poverty  is  a  contributing  factor  to  the  spread  of  HIV/AIDS  and  is  thereby  
undermining economic security, and, at the same time exacerbating poverty. Consequently that 
means we need to address poverty and HIV/AIDS together. 
3.  
We resolve that the Basic Income Grant is a necessity to reduce poverty and to promote 
economic empowerment, freeing the productive potential of the people currently trapped in the 
vicious and deadly cycle of poverty. 
Therefore: 
1.  
We agree that every Namibian should receive a Basic Income Grant until she or he becomes 
eligible for a government pension at 60 years.  
2.  
The level of the Basic Income Grant should be not less than N$ 100 per person per month. 
3.  
The Basic Income Grant should be an unconditional grant to every Namibian.  
4.  
The  costs  for  the  Basic  Income  Grant  should  be  recovered  through  a  combination  of  
progressively designed tax reforms. 
 We the undersigned organisations committed ourselves to working together with all stakeholders to make 
the Basic Income Grant a reality in Namibia. We invite and call upon all stakeholders to join our effort 
and to become a member of this coalition.  
Umbrella organisations: 
1.  
Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN),  
2.  
National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW)  
3.  
 
Namibian NGO Forum (NANGOF) 
4.  
Namibia Network of AIDS Service Organisations (NANASO) 
Individual organisations: 
Legal Assistance Centre (LAC); Labour Resource and Research Institute (LaRRI) 
Searched 12 April 2010 
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